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ACCESS TO JUSTICE
VARIATIONS AND CONTINUITY OF A WORLD-WIDE
MOVEMENT*
By Mauro Cappelletti,Bryant Garth and Nicolb Trocker
Florence, Bloomington, Ind., and Siena*
Recent Developments in
1.Assessing the Access-to Justice Phenomenon: The Insights of Reviews - I1.
Access to Justice - 1. Legal Aid and Advice - 2. The Representation of Diffuse Interests - II1. The
Efforts to Go Beyond the Provision of Legal Services The "Third Wave" of the Access-to-Justice
Movement - 1.The Trend Toward Conciliation - 2. Changes in the Legal Profession - IV. Access to
Justice Today

Six years ago, the authors of this article presented the "Comparative
General Report" on "Access to Justice" at the Conference on "Der Schutz
des Schwaicheren im Recht," organized by the Max-Planck-Institut fiur
auslindisches und internationales Privatrecht to celebrate the 50th
anniversary of the Institute's foundation.' That report was, in fact, a
comparative analysis of the preliminary results of a large research project.
This project was concluded about three years ago with the publication of
the Florence Access-to-Justice series. 2 Since then, there has been a more
recent volume that continued the theoretical approach of the Florence
Project.' Also, in the spring of 1981, the twenty-one Ministers of Foreign
Affairs of the Council of Europe agreed to recommend to their governments
a series of measures "to facilitate access to justice." 4
As the Florence Project in large part indeed sought to describe and
explain a profound "movement" in law, we do not think that those who
contributed to or have been interested in the Project can now simply ignore
the movement's continuing manifestations. Developments in access to
justice provide vital insights into the role of the legal profession, legal
procedures, and law generally, and new developments must be used to test
the validity of the insights proffered in the Project publications. We
therefore believe it useful to keep abreast of the changing situations in
*This article was originally published byRabels Zeitschreft (Vol. 42 No. 4, pp. 664-707). Authorization was obtained to republish it in the Revista Juridica de laUniversidad de Puerto Rico.
oThis article was the basis of a conference by Prof. Mauro Cappelletti, held in the School of Law of
the University of Puerto Rico during the month of August, 1984.
.Set Cappelletti/Garth/Trocker, Acess to Justice, Comparative General Report: Rabels Z 40 (1976)
669.
2 See supra, notee
3 Access to Justice and the Welfare State, ed. by Cappelletti (Alphen a/d. Rijn etc. 1981)
4 Council of Europe, Recommendation No. R (81)7, reproduced in full infra, p.
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various countries and to consider the responses to the Project series. If one
test of the Project's ideas and insights is whether they help to explain and
evaluate new national developments, another is surely the opinions of the
many scholars and practitioners who have considered the Project volumes
and reviewed their contents.
This report will be organized in the following manner. It will examine
the scholarly reactions from a number of reviewers to the publications of the
series (infra, sub I). It will then report on recent developments, especially in
Europe and in the United States (infra, sub II and III). And we will conclude
by trying to provide some perspective of the meaning of the access-to-justice
movement today (infra, sub IV).
I. Assessing the Access-to-Justice Phenomenon:
The Insights of Reviews
The crucial importance of access-to-justice problems is demonstrated in
part by the widespread interest that the Project volumes have generated.
Numerous reviewers have already introduced the Project results to their
reading publics, several conferences on access to justice have-been held, 5 and
government agencies have been discussing this work. 6 On the practical level
there is a broad consensus that reforms in courts, in court procedures, and in
the legal profession are necessary to adapt the systems of justice to new
social policies and newly-recognized interests. More creativity and
experimentation are clearly required, and comparative study can help to
suggest new and promising approaches if not specific candidates for
transplantation. Increasingly it is recognized that the organization of
lawyers, courts, and other dispute processing institutions determines to a
great extent which kind of disputes will be brought to the law, whose rights
will be enforced, and even what the result may be of negociations that take
place outside of the courts. The institutions are not sacred: they serve to aid
or twart the implementation of social policies.
The substantive law las increasingly been manipulated in recent
decades to enforce governmental policies; and now there has been a strong
tendency to manipulate procedural law and institutions with those same
policies in mind. One of those policies, quite clearly, consists simply in
favoring access to lawyers and the institutions necessary to resolve disputes
and enforce legal rights.
There appears to be little debate about the foregoing observations. And
while the independent value of access is generally accepted, it also is
increasingly recognized that access cannot be the only goal. "Access to
justice" suggests that "access" itself is an instrumental value, which can
promote any of a number of substantive results. Even "justice" is an

5 For example, a conference on "Access to Justice in Israel" took place in May 1981, at Bar-Ilan
University. In September 1980, the Ministers of Justice of French-speaking countries held a conference
on "Lacces i la justice" in Paris.
6 For the United States, for example, Maurice Rosenberg, then in charge of the U.S. Justice
Department's Office for Improvements in the Administration of Justice, prepared a lengthy review of
the series for the "Council on the Role of Courts" (unpublished, on file at the European University
Institute, Florence).
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ambiguous term, which can refer to a variety of possible situations. Many of
the most insightful questions raised by reviews about the "Access-toJustice" Project 7 and movement concern precisely these difficult problems
embedded in the idea of access to justice.
The first question, as Martin Partingtonwrites, is to "whose justice is
access being sought." 8 There were discussions of this problem in various
Project studies, but perhaps this political issue merits further elaboration.
The Project's general report in Volume I focused on access to justice as a
movement to make particular rights effective, especially the rights of the
poor, consumers, environmentalists, employees, tenants, and the like 9. It
was argued that often these rights, typical of modern welfare states, have not
been well enforced, and changes in the legal system are being made to
facilitate the enforcement. Access reforms are in large part efforts to bring to
relatively weak groups rights that have been emboided in welfare state
legislation. The concern here is as much with the results of access as with
access itself. Justice implies here some effort to support what might be
called the redistribution of rights implied in the modern welfare state.' 0
If access to justice means in part this political, redistributive trend,
which of course derives from complex social and economic forces, then we
must ask the further question of whether a focus merely on the law and legal
istitutions pays too little attention to the political power and influence of
the groups whom changes in the legal system were supposed to benefit.
2
Several commentators, including Roman Tomasic" and Philip Lewis,'
13
raise this issue. They suggest that all the detailed discussions of legal
phenomena may obfuscate the real issue. It may be that disadvantaged
groups simply require more power in order to obtain more social benefits
and rights. If they become more powerful, they will find a way to obtain
their rights, whether through legal reform or otherwise. The results of the
legal process merely ratify the distribution of power.
These are weighty issues, involving the basic problem of the
relationship of law to politics and society. Without pretending to resolve
that question, a first response to this line of argument is simply that most
of these rights have been enacted into law, implying some political
consensus or at least suficient political power to demand reforms on behalf
of the relatively weak. The political power issue has to some extent receded
into the background. Moreover, our role, as scholars of the legal system, is

7 Reviews have been published in at least fourteen countries, but it would not be useful to list all of
them here. A number of reviews are discussed infra, at text accompanying notes 8-32. But see also, e.g.,
the following general reviews, which are not discussed infra; Commonwealth L. Bull. 5 (1979) 1379;
Koiima, Comp. L. Rev. (lapan) 14 (1980) 163; Baur, ZZP 93 (1980) 92; David, Rev. int. dr. comp. 31 (1979)
617; Ekel6f, SvJT 1981, 109; Hutcheson, Mod. L. Rev. 43 (1980) 483; Jacoby, Am.J. Comp. L. 29 (1981)
532; Stalev, Socialistizesko prav

28 (1979) 78; van Compernolle, Rev. Inst. belge 57 (1980) 424.

8 Partington, L. Q. Rev. 97 (1981) 185.
9 See Cappelletti/Garth,Access to Justice, Comparative General Report: Rebels Z40 (1976) 669.
The Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, in: Access to Justice I at 3.
10See also CappeUetti/Garth,Foreword - Access to Justice as a Focus of Research: Windsor YB. of
Access to Justice 1 (1981) p. IX.
11 Tomasic, Legal Serv. Bull. 5 (1980) 100.
12Lewis, Int.-J. Sociol. L. 9 (1981) 109.
13 See also notes 19-:28 and accompanying text infra.
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mainly to work on the assumption that the rights that are proclaimed are
supposed to be enforced. We can analyze the barriers to enforcement and let
others draw the conclusions that follow from the politico-legal steps that
are taken to promote or hinder enforcement. Indeed, the details of access to
justice may be more useful to political analysts than a priori theorizing
about the powerful and the weak.1 4 Finally, even if law be merely
"superstructure" as some Marxist and various other kinds of determinists
might argue, it is nevertheless increasingly 5 admitted that the law and legal
processes do have some "relative autonomy". If there is autonomy, relative
or otherwise, questions of "how much" and "to what effect" again force us
to consider access-to-justice details.
Maurice Rosenberg (then Assistant Attorney General) made a slightly
different political criticism. He suggested that the Project was not
politically naive, but rather too political. He emphasized and perhaps in
part complained that the Project's concern was essentially with advocacy of
the political power and rights of the underprivileged. 16 There may be truth
to that observation, but the access-to-justice movement need not rely only
on the legalizing of a political program. One need not favor the
enforcement of those rights more than other rights to make them a focus for
study and reform. The fact is that it is these rights that have, for a variety of
reasons, an extraordinary symbolic value in the welfare state, and it is they
that have raised the most fundamental problem for our modern legal
systems. They pose a challenge to which reformers - some motivated by
pure politics and some by a more technical desire to make the legal system
responsive to new rights and interests - have begun to respond.
Another politico-legal question about the access-to-j ustice movement is
whether the new rights can in fact be made effective through the reform
trends described in Project reports. Tomasic points out that there is as of yet
little solid empirical evidence to justify much confidence that these reforms
do make these rights effective to any great extent. 17 Rosenberg also suggests
an "idealistic" emphasis on courts and laws as means of delivering social
benefits.' 8 The problem is raised especially, however, in the lengthy reviews
by Jacinta Paroni Rumi' 9 and Austin Sarat,20 both of which seek to
concentrate on the issue of what can be accomplished by the reform cycle
prompted by a perceived gap in the enforcement of new rights and an effort
to adapt the machinery of justice to facilitate enforcement. In part, of course,
this is a technical question, but it too returns us to the political question of
what techniques are politically possible.

" Marini, Politica del diritto 11 (1981) 585 (614) thus suggested: "The validity of reforms must
not be examined in abstract, but requires the operation of a critical analysis of the functions of the
juridical institutions in relation to the effective distribution of power in the society, seeking to find in
the judicial mechanisms the dialectic between interests already realized and those still to realize."
15 See, e.g., Marx and Engels on Law, ed. by Cain/Hunt (New York 1979).
16 See Rosenberg (supra, note 6).
17 See Tornasic (supra, note 11) at 101.
18 See Rosenberg (supra, note 6).
19 Paroni Ruri, Sociologia del diritto 7 (1980) 149.
20 Sarat, Harv. L. Rev. 94 (1980/81) 1911.
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Paroni Rumi concludes her throughtful review by discussing the
"lesson of pluralism" mentioned in several Project studies. She
21
characterizes it, however, as "an expression typical of the U.S. world."
She suggests that the numerous institutions, reforms in the legal
profession, alternatives to the courts, and the like, are typical of an
American approach to social problem and social change - an approach
that relies almost obsessively on a plurality of devices and reforms rather
than one coherent plan. This approach reflects the weak, antiprogrammatic American political party system. She observes that, while
many devices are created, seeming to reflect a number of efforts and
experiments to implement a desired social policy, it may be that his
apparent reform activity is mainly symbolic, more theater than reality. It
helps to provide psychological benefits to diverse groups and to preserve
social equilibrium, but it may not result in social change. Numerous new
laws and procedural changes give the illusion of political transformation,
but real reform may not come without a sustained political commitment to
in fact accomplish change. Her conclusion, however, is not that nothing is
being accomplished. Rather, this entire movement - which of course has
many parallels outside of the United States - must be evaluated carefully in
order to determine which "reforms" in substance and procedure are merely
symbolic and which ones also contribute to actual changes.
Sarat's review takes a very similar approach, chiding the Project for
ignoring "the legitimation function of the recognition and extension of
rights".2 2 He also notes a failure in what he considers the Project's general
assessment of the "third wave" of reforms, which emphasize changes in the
legal system not limited to providing legal representation. He sees this tliird
wave as "a retreat from the commitments and possibilities of the first
two." 23 In other words, he sees some potential in the provision of legal
services, but a seemingly broader approach culminates in activities that
only serve to "legitimate" the system, not change it in favor of the
disadvantaged. We shall return to the problem of how to characterize the
"Third wave", but it is useful to ask how the legitimacy idea furthers our
analysis.
The focus on legitimacy no doubt provides some explanatory power,
but Sarat's own review illustrates the problems it raises as a tool for
evaluating access to justice. On the one hand, he suggests that "access to
justice can never be fully realized in a liberal society," 24 which is no doubt
true (about any society), but the emphasizes on the other hand that "[a]ccess
25
may have significant redistributional consequences."
Access reforms may in other words accomplish only legitimation, or
they may provide change. We agree with that point, and we in fact have
written that the "access-to-justice movement and its opposite are very
21
22
23
24
25

Paroni Rumi (supra, note 19) at 159.
See Sarat (supra, note 20) at 1915.
Id. at 1919.
Id. at 1924.
Id. at 1924.
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similar in appearance." 26 The question, however, is how can one tell
whether legal changes in a particular country, to quote the statement of
David Trubek cited by Sarat, "will succeed only in securing the reforms
which will increase the legitimacy of the current system, and fail to secure
those that will make it really change." 27 A priori theorizing will not tell us
the difference between real change and merely symbolic change. Only
empirical research can tell us what actually happens, and, indeed, it is a
matter of debate as to what would be real social change and what would not
be. Our approach at this point is simply to recognize that access to justice, as
was stated in the foreword to Volume III, is an experiment in welfare state
rights and, more generally, in welfare state politics." 28 Let us see what the
potential is of the welfare state before dismissing it as a symbolic product of
legitimation needs. Sarat, however, like Paroni Rumi, raises a critical
question, and we hope it continues to be addressed in future research on this
topic.
Considerable legal reform activity is certainly not the same thing as
social reform. The further question, also raised by some reviewers, is
whether anyone really would be pleased with an unequivocal commitment
to make new rights effective through legal and politico-legal reforms.2 9
This question refers in part simply to the cost of the reform machinerynew courts, more judges, and the commitment of more and more legal and
paralegal personnel to the difficult problem of making individuals aware of
their new rights and willing to take measures to enforce them. But it also
refers to the costs of enforcement - no one really wants all the
underenforced laws to be enforced, even if that would perhaps mean the
realization of the legal changes embodied in welfare state legislation. The
access-to-justice movement, as described in the Project reports, tends to
assume that many new rights, designed to benefit ordinary people, are going
"by default", in the words of the British Lord Chancellor's Advisory
Committee on Legal Aid and Advice,30 and that more enforcement is
necessary to make these rights more than merely symbolic. Of course, as
was pointed out in Project reports, enforcement may often be efficiently and
effectively accomplished by methods that require no courts or lawyers. But
there also seems to be a strong tendency or necessity to enhance the
importance of law and lawyers. We must recognize the limits of excessive
legalism - where the law and legal regulation closely structure all
relationships. At one level there is a question of priorities, and at another is
the question of how far we want to go with the extension of legal rights.

26 Cappelletti/Garth, Foreword, in: Access to Justice III at V, IX.
27 Trubek, Public Advocacy - Administrative Government and the Representation of Diffuse
Interests, in: Access to Justice III at 445, 493.
28 Cappelletti/Garth(supra, note 26) at XVII.
29 See, e.g., Garrett,Law Society's Gaz, May 21, 1980, p. 520: "The ultimate cost (which in the end
the 'consumer' must pay) would be prohibitive, the temptation to over-use the service would be
overwhelming and we should lose what is left of our sturdy common sense willingness to put up with
quite a lot that we do not like in the interest of getting on with our life and work.'

30 Lord Chancellor's Office, Legal Aid and Advice 1972-73 [Twenty-third Report] (1973) 26.
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There has indeed been a reaction to the specific problem of excessive
legalism (which in part reflects also the general reaction to some of the costs
of the welfare state), and this reaction has increasingly generated a new kind
of legal procedural reform. There has been a tremendous recent upsurge in
interest in conciliatory approaches to justice, as emphasized by Sarat,
among others, and described below."1 The focus is not on finding ways to
help people vindicate their rights but rather on ways to bring them to an
amicable agreement. To the extent that this new focus relies on agreement,
not coercion, it moves closer to negotiation than adjudication. Such
agreements, however, will inevitably reflect the relative bargaining power
of the disputants. Thus one can argue that the political (welfare state)
underpinning of the access-to-justice movement will be lost, since the new
rights sought to be enforced were aimed at redressing social inequalities.
These rights may be forgotten in a conciliation setting, where the dominant
interest is in harmony. Thus, Sarat argues, the wave of reform emphasizing
conciliation is a way to prevent the real change that rights enforcement
might have accomplished for the weak.32 That important question, as we
shall see, cannot be answered in the abstract. But it provides a setting and a
theme by which to consider the meaning today of access to justice and its
various modes of reform. We turn now to the current manifestations of the
"access-to-justice" movement, and our conclusion will return to Sarat's
concern and the problems highlighted generally by the reviews just
discussed.
II. Recent Developments in Access to Justice
We cannot cover all developments which relate to the concerns of the
Florence Project, but we can provide some coverage especially of the
situation in Europe and the United States. They will be discussed very
briefly, following the "three wave" schema of the Project's general report.33
Our aim is to provide information, suggest the kind of activity that is taking
place, and hopefully shed some more light on the important legal and
political questions discussed in the previous part of this report. The accessto-justice movement is continuing, but is not necessarily expanding.
Whether the access-to-justice approach as described before is one that will
continue to characterize legal developments in modern societies is not easy
to decide, but it would certainly be premature to see the future only from the
perspective of the present financial crises. Bold initiatives in welfare state
programs are unlikely at this point, but we cannot say for sure if reform has
merely slowed down or has taken a new direction. In any event, the
following discussion will demonstrate once more Franz Klein's insight that
are amount the most
the "varied manifestations [of civil procedure]
34
important documents of mankind's culture."

31 See notes 107-175 and acompanying text infra.
32 See Sarat (supra,note 20) at 1919.
33 See Cappelletti/Garth(supra, note 9); CappeUettilGarth/Trocker(supra, note 1) at 681-717.

34 F. Klein, Zeit-und Geistesstromungen im Prozesse 2 (1958) 8.
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1. Legal Aid and Advice
There are competing aspects related to devices providing legal aid and
advice for the poor.
One is simply the task of providing an affordable or even gratuitous
lawyer to an individual who would like legal counsel. Such judicare
systems have tended to reflect primarily that individualistic concern, and it
is -also probably the basic concern of the well-funded Swedish combined
staff and judicare program.3 5 The problems include the income eligibility
limits, the method for proving eligibility, the compensation to the attorney,
and the availability of free legal advice as well as representation in court.
Recent developments in France, Belgium, Great Britain, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and Sweden have addressed these technical but
nevertheless important concerns.
In France,which has had a judicare system since 1972, art. 72 of the Loi
de finances of December 31, 1980 liberalized eligibility limits to keep up
with inflation.3 6 The maximum monthly income for full state
subsidization of legal aid for an individual went from 1620 francs to 2700
francs, while that for partial state subsidization rose from 2100 to 3500
francs. The maximum compensation for lawyers, however, was raised only
from 1080 francs to 1300 francs. Thus while the individual eligibility limits
have now gone since 1972 from 1500 and 2500 to 2700 and 3500, the
maximum compensation payable to lawyers has moved only from 100 and
1300 francs. Lawyers have complained from the beginning that their
compensation is inadequate, and they can be expected to complain even
37
more.

Already the French system, however, is an advance on the "charitable"
system of legal aid, which still is found in Italy 38 and, with some recent
modification, in Belgian law. In Belgium, a law of April 9, 1980, provides
some comensation for young "pro deo" lawyers who furnish assistance, but
this is just a first step. 39 Regular lawyers (not apprentices or "stagiaires")
are not compensated for any legal aid work they undertake. The existing
system was otherwise unchanged. But, as the title of the law itself states, this
legation only claims to give "une solution partielle au probleme de
I'assistance judiciaire". 40 Legal aid reform has begun, but has a long way to
go in Belgium.
35 On judicare and the Swedish system, see generally, (Cappelletti/Gordley/Johnson,
Jr. Toward

Equal Justice - A Comparative Study of Legal Aid in Modern Societies (Milan and Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.,
1975) 271-450, 525-583. On Sweden see also Boman, Scandinavia, in: Perspective on Legal Aid, ed. by
Zemans (Westport, Conn., 1979) 243-253.
36 See Loi de finances No. 80-1094 du 30 D&. 1980, J.O. 1980, 3099.
37 For recent complaints, see, e. g. Justice - Aid Jidiciaire, Rponses des ministres aux questions
6crites: Gaz. Pal., May 29, 1980, at 2; Ordre des avocats au barreau de Nevens, D6libration en l'aide
judiciaire: Gaz. Pal., April 7, 1981, at 13. See generally Thery, Access to Justice in France, in: Access to
Justice I at 479, 485; Hamelin/Danien, Les r~gles de la nouvelle profession d'avocat (1981) at 168-172,
249-250. After this report was completed, a new French decree (decret no. 82-141 of 9 Feb. 1982, J.O.
1982, 95) has substantially raised the compensation for lawyers.
38 See generally Trocker, Assistenza legale e giustizia civile, Due studi sull' evoluzione
del'assistenza legale ai meno abbienti nel mondo contemporaneo (1979); Vigoriti, Italy, in: Zemans
(supra, note 35) at 177.
39 Bull. 16g. beige 1980, 203.
40 rbid.
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Great Britain, responding in part to the close scrutiny provided by the
Royal Commission on Legal Services, 4' also made substantial changes in
the eligibility limits. 42 When the judicare scheme began operation in 1949,
roughly 70 to 80 percent of the populartion was eligible for some subsidization of legal aid, but this figure had declined to about 30 percent by
1976-77. In April 1979, despite worries about the cost of the program, the
figures were raised substantially by the Legal Aid Act 1979. Once again, up
to 70 percent of the populartion will be eligible The compensation for
private attorneys is still not full fees they would normally receive, but i.t is
sufficient to create an incentive to do legal aid work. There indeed is an
active debate about whether a law firm could make a reasonable profit
existing solely on legal aid work. 43 at present, however, it appears that the
only place where any private law firms do subsist entirely on judicare is the
Netherlands, where the judicare system remains the primary approach to
44
legal aid.
The Swedish system, in effect since 1972, has been modified only
slightly. 45 The indexing of the financial limits to the cost of living prevents
the problems of declining eligibility. Sweden thus continues to allow subsidized legal aid to a very large proportion of the populartion. Changes in the
Swedish system have taken the form of improving its efficiency. Thus the
procedure for qualifying for legal aid and advice has been simplified. In
many cases now eligibility can be decided by lawyers and courts rather than
"legal aid board so". On the other hand, the public legal aid offices, which
already played a very limited role, have recently been reduced in number
from six to two.

41 See supra, note.*
42

See generally Edwards, Big Changes in Legal Aid: Law Society's Gaz., Feb. 14, 1979, at 145. The
limit for "disposable income" free of contribution went from 815 to 1500 per year and the limit for
eligibility at all went from 2600 to 3600 .Disposable income is gross income minus income tax, national
insurance, expenses of going to work, and housing. The raise took place prior to the Royal Commission
Report, but the scrutiny of the Commission no doubt helped promote this develpment. See also Royal
Commission at 113-125. -Some administrative streamlining also took place with the abolition of the
distinction between area and local committees. See Edwards, Changes in Legal Aid Administration:
Law Society's Gaz., March 12, 1980, at 209. - Eligibility has correspondingly been expanded by changes
in the "green form" scheme that allow lawyers to provide aid under the scheme (whereby the solieitor
need not obtain the authority o.the legal aid areas ottice to provide aid up to a certain cost) and extended
to aid in magistrates' courts. See Royal Commission note 40, at 114-115. Edwards,Civil Proceedings in
Magistrates' Courts and Legal Aid, Amendments in Green Form Scheme: Law Society's Gaz., Nov. 14,
1979 at 117. See also Civil Legal Aid and Legal Advice (financial eligibility): Law Society's Gaz., Nov.
18, 198i, at 1284.
43 See, e. g. A Solicitor, Is Legal Aid Practice Possible?: Legal Action Group Bull. 1978, 205;
Edwards, Does Legal Aid Pay? Law Society's Gaz., Sep. 19, 1979, at 889; Simmons-Bennet, Legal Aid Educating the Public: Law Society's Gaz., May 20, 1981, at 336.
44 See, e.g. 1. Cooper, Public Legal Services in Three Countries - A study of the Relationship
Between Policyand Practice (diss., Florence 1981) 110-114.
45 See Himmel-Liliegren, Rechts- und ProzeBkostenhilfe in Schweden: Z.f. Rpol. 1979, 312;
Lindblom, Procedure, in: An Introduction to Swedish Law, ed. by Stromholm (1981) 95, 127-129. In
Norway, a Government Bill currently before Parliament proposes new rules on legal aid and advice.
The Bill which consolidates and replaces present provisions, inter aliaraises the existing income limits,
extends the competence of the courts to grant legal aid and enables advocates to grant free legal advice up
to a limit of 10 hours work.
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A limitation on the French system, unlike the other ones mentioned
here, is the lack of availability of judicare lawyers for legal advice as opposed
to representation in court. This also has been for a long time a key problem
in the FederalRepublic of Germany, but the new German legal aid scheme,
enacted into law in 1980, seeks to change that situation.46 Lawyers under the
reformed system can obtain reimbursement of up to 100 marks for legal
advice to qualified individuals, except in social and labor matters, and the
lawyers themselves can make the determination of whether the client is
eligible. One hundred marks is a rather small sum, and there is some
skepticism 47 about whether lawyers will use this reform widely, but it
signals an important step in improving the German judicare system. Germany's neighbor, Austria, which has a judicare system like that of Ger48
many, appears to be moving in the same direction of reform.
These judicare reforms help individuals with recognized legal
problems- especially in family matters, such as divorce, and for criminal
defense- to obtain an affordable lawyer. An increasing number of countries, however, have found that other legal aid reforms are needed to attract
the nontraditional claims of the poor such as welfare, tenant, and consumer
rights. One method to attract such claims is to have publicly-founded,
decentralized offices such as the neighborhood law firms begun in 1965 in
the United States. Analogues to such offices are now found in Australia,
Canada, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Norway, and to some extent in
Belgium and France. 49 These institutions are characterized generally by
their efforts to inform the poor of their rights and help them through both
individual and collective action to enforce them. Clearly, this is a more
controversial form of legal aid than judicare, as shown by the recurring
attacks on and the current plight of the Legal Services Corporation in the
United States. Indeed, while there are good reasons to combine judicare
with publicly-funded offices, and there is some movement in that direction
in the United States, 50 some critics of activism see judicare as a way to avoid
test cases, class actions, community education, and similar legal aid
advocacy.

46 Gesetz fiber Rechtsberatung und Vertretung Fur Buirger mit geringem Einkommen
(Beratungshilfegesetz) of June 10, 1980, BGBI. 1689. The law went intoeffect Jan. 1, 1981. See generally
Grunsky, Die neuen Gesetze uber die ProzeBkosten-und Beratungs-hilfe: NJW 1980, 2041.
Important changes have been introduced also in the field of legal aidand legal asistance.The Gesetz
ilber die ProzeBkostenhilfe of June 13, 1980, BGBI. 1673, has a) raised the income eligibility limits; b)
simplified the method for proving eligibility; c) improved the compensation to lawyers. The law went
into effect on Jan. 1, 1981. See generally Schneider, ProzeBkostenhilfe: MDR 1981, 1; Schuster, Das
Gesetz iiber die ProzeBkosten-hilfe: ZZP 93 (1980) 361; Scheneider, ProzeBkostenhilfe - eine
Zwischenbilanz: MDR r981, 793.
17 See, eg., Bischof, Praxisprobleme des Beratungshilfegesetzes: NJW 1981,894;Blankenburg,Zur
Implementation des Beratungshilfegesetzes: RuPol. 17 (1981) 84; Reich, Rechtsberatung im
Verbraucherschutz:
Z.f.Rpol. 1981, 53; Lindemann, Beratungshilfe in der Praxis: NJW 1981, 1638.
48
See, e.g. Kohlegger, Mehr Chancengleichheit bei der Rechtsberatung und Rechtsverfolgung in
Zivilrechtsangelegenheiten: RuPol. 1980, 14-1; Machacek, Der demokratische Rechtsstaat streitet fur der
besseren Zutrit zum Recht: Anwaltsbl. 1978, 95.
49 See generally Garth, Neighborhood Law Firms for the Poor: A Comparative Study of Recent
Developments in Legal Aid and in the Legal Profession (Alphen a/d Rijn 1980).
50 See Legal Services Corporation, Delivery Systems Study (1979).
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In The United States, President Reagan, who as Governor of California
had some notable battles with publicly-funded legal aid offices, apparently
5
Surely this attack is
is seeking to eliminate the Legal Services Corporation.
partly a component of the effort to out governmental nonmilitary spending,
but the attack must be seen mainly as an ideological one on the comparatively small, 321 million dollars program. A major conservative force, the
Heritage Foundation, called the Legal Services Corporation "one of the
federal instrumentalities by which the personnel and institutions of the
ideological 'left' in American life have been financed". 52 The National
Defeat Legal Services Committee, organized by Howard J. Phillip of the
National Conservative Caucus, has stated that legal services personnel re an
"elite corps" of "avowed Marxist".5 3 For anyone familiar with the American
program, these characterizations would be amusing, were they not so dangerous. Evidently the idea of the government funding an advocate for the
interests of the poor has upset many "conservatives" who, in fact, are also
opposed to the extension and enforcement of rights on behalf of the poor.
They have succeeded in making the future of the Corporation very much in
doubt.
The effort to save the Corporation, however, is a strong one, motivated
by a group who in many ways are more deserving than their opponents to be
called conservative. The program's extraordinary growth from 1974 to 1980,
when the budget went from 71 to 321 million dollar, reflected a very strong,
bi-partisan support. The American Bar Association in particular has long
recognized that the legal aid system is a means to enhance respect for the law
and prevent social disruption as well as means for advocacy of the rights of
the poor. And that advocacy, as spokesmen for the bar have noted, must
include test cases, law reform, and law enforcement on behalf of groups of
individuals. Others have recognized, as the first President of the Legal
Services Corporation, Thomas Ehrlich, has recently emphasized, that the
4
provision of legal services has a profoundly conservative dimension ot it.5
Ehrlich quotes then-President Nixon for the statement what "We have...
learned that justice is served far betther and ifferences are settled more
rationally within the system than on the streets". It remains to be seen how
successful the defense of the Legal Services Corporation will be. 55
The utility of institutions similar to the American Legal Services Corporation has been recognized increasingly in other countries, such as Great
Britain and the Netherlands, again building on the kind of logic that

51 See generally Ehrlich, Save the Legal Services Corporation: Am. B. Ass.J. 67 (1981) 434;
MacKerron, Legal Services Corp. Supporters Fear It May Be "Block Granted" to Death: National J.,
Feb. 28, 1981, at 358.
52 See id.at 360.
53 See National Defeat Legal Service Committee, Letter from Howard Phillip, National Director
(the Conservative Caucus, Sept. 8, 1980).
54 See Ehrlich (supra, note 51).
55 Id. at 436.
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seemingly has been rejected by the Reagan administration. There is in these
about
countries, however, also some political opposition and uncertaintly
56
the idea of governmental subsidization of "social advocacy".
In Great Britain, the Royal Commission on Legal Services, which
reported in 1979,17 evinced substantial hostility to what it felt was political
activity by the thirty or so law centres now active there, even if the
Commission also called for a substantial expansion in the number of such
centres. The reaction among commentators, however, including the Law
Society, has been much more favorable to the current activities of law
centres. Most informed lawyers recognize that aggressive advocacy of legal
rights is what they are supposed to do, even if it may appear to have a
political impact. The law centres, in Great Britain have a very strong need
for secure and increased central funding. They appear to be holding their
own, but expansion requires a material commitment. Given that the
judicare scheme is already considered expensive, at 66.5 million pounds
sterling for civil legal aid, no one expects at this point that theThatcher
government will expand suddenly the public sector. 58 The Law Centres
Federation has therefore recently lamented, "Does the future never
come?", 9 and the Legal Action Group reported in March 1981 that "This
has been a bad year for legal services." 60 Stinginess certainly has been a
leading theme in a number of countries in their approaches to legal aid
reform.
The Netherlandscan perhaps be pointed to as a potential bright spot in
the reform of legal aid. While not yet enacted into law, the Ministry of
Justice has created a well-funded network of legal advice bureaux
("Bureaux voor Rechtshulp") that grant legal aid certificates for the
61
judicare system and provide "first-line" legal advice themselves. It is stil
not clear how much social advocacy will be encouraged under the system as
enacted into law, but there are reports that the Ministry of Justice
tnderstands and sympathizes with those who are urging a commitment in
that direction. Moreover, it should be remembered that, in part because of
the well-funded judicare program and the liberal compensation for private
attorneys, there is an active- "social bar" in addition to the offices that are
62
salaried by the. government.

56 The term is from Selznick, Social.Advocacy and the Legal Profession in-the U.S.A., in: Lawyers
in Their Social Setting (Edinburgh 1976).
57 See Royal Commission at 79-91.
58 The Legal Action Group, in its "Annual Report to Members, Feb. 1980 to Feb. 1981", suggests
that "the general feeling is that the Report is dead - it has not even been debated in Parliament": LAG
Bull. 1981, 56 See also Zander, Commission Examines English Legal Profession: Am.B.Ass.J. 66 (1980)
568.
59 Law Centres Federation, Law Centre Funding - Does the Future Never Come?: Law Centres'
News, Winter 1981, No. 8 p. 1

60 See LAG. Annual Report (supra, note 58).
61 See, e.g., Cooper (supra, note 44) at 68-70.
62 See, e.g. Garth (supra, note 49) at 118-124.
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standing to sue in court by organizations, are continuing to break down in
Europe, but it is still the case that no country has gone as far as the United
States in permitting court access for lawsuits on behalf of diffuse interests
(even if standing rights have been constricted somewhat there in the past
few years). 72 These trends are best understood if we distingish two ways of
approaching the problem of the private representation of diffuse and
collective interests. One, found in its purest form in the United States,
centers on the "private attorney general" and class actions, while the
second, typical of Continental Europe, centers on representation by
established private organizations. While the distinctions are necessarily
overdrawn, they provide a means to categorize recent developments and a
key to some of the problems that are emerging in both Europe and the
United States.
a) Class Actions and Private Attorneys General
The class action device and its utility as a tool for the judicial protection
of diffuse interests has been described elsewhere in some detail. 73 While the
74
number of federal class actions has declined somewhat in recent years,
they remain of considerable importance in the United States. For our
purposes the class action can be seen as a means by which an attorney who
has one client with the relevant stake in the litigation can sue on behalf of a
large and otherwise unorganized collective interest. The client ostensibly
represents the group, but generally it is thought that the lawyer runs the
show. Many commentators have noted that it gives "lawyer-entrepreneurs"
an incentive to organize lawsuits on behalf of a class when no single
member of the class would have a sufficient incentive to take a case to court.
In the United States, class actions and these private attorneys general are
still very controversial, but recent statutory and case law developments have
nevertheless increased their importance for the vindication of the rights of
many diffuse interests, particularly the interests of those who have been
victims of unlawful discrimination. For example, the rules of the legal
75
profession barring advertising and solicitation have been relaxed, thus
allowing private attorneys general to be more aggressive about finding
clients willing to serve as class representatives. And, perhaps more
importantly, a number of recent laws have been enacted providing for

72 See generally van Dijk, Judicial Review of Governmental Action and the Requirement of an
Intereft to Sue (Aljphen a/d Rijn 1980).
73 See, e.g. Developments in the Law - Class Actions: Harv. L. Rev. 89 (1975/76) 1318-1644.
74 See Administrative Office of the United States Courts, 1979 Annual Report of the Director (1979)
78-79.
15 See In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978) (solicitation by NAACP permitted); Bates v. States Bar of
Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (permitting advertising by a legal clinic).
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attorney's fees to prevailing parties who vindicate federal rights. 76
Interestingly, a very recent enactment of this type, respecting actions against
the United States, was called the "Equal Access to Justice Act".

77

These

statutes, moreover, have been interpreted so that the American rule of each
party paying his own attorney has been changed only half way: there is only
a very small risk that losing plaintiffs will have to pay the attorneys' fees of
their opponents. Thus, while the contingent fee and some other judicially
created exceptions to the American rule already provided a monetary
incentive to attorneys in class actions for large amounts of damages, these
changes further encourage the bringing of actions where the monetary
damages may be small or the aim is only to affect future behavior of the
adverse party.
The American system maximizes opportunities and incentives for
private lawyers to take action to see that laws are enforced in the interests of
groups who would no otherwise sue. These opportunities are especially
important given the recent relative decline in the funding base for the socalled public interest law firm. 78 There are also, however, several potential
problems of giving lawyers too much incentive and power to mobilize
lawsuits. 79 Lawyers may ultimately be unaccountable to the groups they
ostensibly are helping. A lawyer-dominated class may also be ineffective,
even if it wins a victory in court, because class actions brought without some
degree of active support from the class may have little success in actually
effecting the desired changes. Moreover, lawyers may sometimes inhibit the
formation of real organizations capable of monitoring lawsuits and
protecting diffuse interests in other forums, such as legislature and
administrative agencies. Accordingly, many of those sympathetic to class
actions also encourage the mobilization of organizational support to go
along with class action lawsuits, and to date the jurisprudence has been
sympathetic to actions by more or less formal organizations. The virtue of
class actions is that they substitute for organizing the parties, which may be
very difficult and expensive. But this is also a potential limitation on their
effectiveness: numerous lawsuits may not lead to effective change, whereas
organized groups may.
Class actions, in addition, are vulnerable to political attack by those
who oppose the enforcement of laws on behalf of diffuse interests. Class
action lawyers often have trouble asserting their independence from the
client and the action. It is then difficult to defend the lawyers as mere agents
of their clients. So far, however, the class action has survived criticism, and

76 See, e.g., Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Award Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988.

77 P-qual Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 96-481, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., 1980.
78 Council for Public Interest Law, Balancing the Scales of Justice: Financing Public Interest Law
in America (1976); Trubek/Trubekl, Civic Justice Through Civil Justice - A New Approach to Public

Interest Advocacy in the United States, in: Accdss to Justice and the Welfare State (supra,note 3) at 119144.
79 See, e.g. Handler, Social Reform Movements and the Legal System (1978)-
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There is thus activity in national legal aid reform, both in judicare and
in staff programs, but it tends for the most part to be tinkering with some
tentative movements to expand. The only really bold initiative appear to be
the effort of destruction taking place in the United States. There are some
European institutionaldevelopments also worth nothing in this area that
help to moderate any reaction in Europe and speed up the reform process in
countries that have not kept up in this area.
In particular, the European Convention on Human Rights, now in
force in twenty countries, is developing a strong jurisprudence in this field.
Article 6 §1 of the Convention provides that "everyone is entitled to a Fair
and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
interpreted that clause to mean "the right to have any claim relating to...
civil rights and obligations brought before a court or tribunal," 63 and the
64
Court has insisted that the right must be a "practical and effective" one.
Accordingly, the Court held in late 1979 that an Irish woman, Mrs. Airey,
who sougbt from the High Court in Ireland a judicial separation, had the
right under the circumstances to the assistance of a lawyer. This decision
has forced Ireland to modernize its legal aid system, resulting in the
adopting of a judicare and staff system in 1980,65 and this line of
jurisprudence may have a similar impact in countries such as Italy that also
have been reluctant to enact legal aid reforms. The Airey case has already
had an Italian impact in the Artico case, which followed it, involving an
Italian man denied the effective assistance of counsel in a criminal
proceeding.6 6 While admittedly the Convention is more specific aboutright
to counsel in criminal matters (Art. 6 § 3), the Court was careful to note that
similar principles would apply under Airey to civil matters.
Two additional aspects of these cases enhance their potential
importance for access to justice in Europe: First, the Court has increasingly
applied Art. 50 of the Convention to them, which allows the Court to, "if

necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party" as redress for a
violation of the Convention. Thus, Mrs. Airey was awarded the sum of 3,140
Irish pounds, which covered her attorney's fees and other damages. 67 These
awards under Art. 50 serve to encourage actions to enforce the European

63 Judgment of Feb. 21, 1975 (Golder v. United Kingdom), YB. Human Rights 18 (1975) 290, § 36.
64 Judgement of Oct. 9, 1979 (Airey v. Ireland), Publications of the European Court of Human
Rights, Series A, Vol. XXXII (Koln 1980) 12.
65 See e.g. Carney, The Growth of Legal Aid in the Republic of Ireland II: Ir.Jr. 14 (1979) 211, 221;

Roseingrave, Summary on Present Position in Ireland (unpublished). The Scheme of Civil Legal Aid
and Adivce has been introduced in Ireland on Aug. 15, 1980.

66 Judgment of May 13, 1980 (Artico), Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series
A, Vol. XXXVII (Koln 1980) 4. See also Pizzorusso, Rossi di vergogna, anzi paonazzi: Foro it. 1980 IV,
150. 67 Judgement of Feb. 1981
(A irey), Publications of the European Court of Human Rights, Series A.,
Vol. XLI (Koin 1981) 9.
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Convention and to increase the pressure on governments to reform their
practices and comply with the Convention. The need to comply has been
bolstered by the European Court's apparent willingness to confront the
question of institutional reform underlying these individual cases. In the
case of Luedicke, Belkacem, and Koc, decided November 28, 1978, the Court
explicitly found that the German system for providing interpreters to
criminal defendants failed to meet Convention standards, and had to be
reformed. 68 In the Airey case a year later, the Court was somewhat more
equivocal, but it clearly placed an affirmative duty on Ireland either to
provide a lawyer free of charge or make judicial procedures sufficiently
simple so that a lawyer would not be required. While recognizing that such
reforms "have implications of a social or economic nature," 69 the Court still
held that the Convention's minimum standards must be met.
In Europe, therefore, the Convention provides a safeguard against the
kind of demolition of legal aid envisioned by the Reagan administration.
While a number of American commentators close to the legal aid movement
in the United States have tried to find a constitutional means to insulate the
program from such attacks, 70 the United States Supreme Court has not been
willing to recognize a right of access to court, much less a right of counsel in
civil matters. While it is difficult to predict how the current economic
situation will affect the funding of legal aid in Europe and the United
States, it may be significant that the European Convention provides at least
a minimum standard below which its signatories will not be allowed to fall.
It may even be that the European Convention, cut off from national
pressures and the perceived institutional limitations of national courts in
ordering legislatures to act or not to act, may be more effective in forcing the
right of access than would be national Constitutional Courts. The specter
of European-wide condemnation has proven very effective in obtaining
respect for the judgements of the European Court of Human Rights.
2. The Representation of Diffuse Interest
The representation of diffuse interests continues to be a fundamental
component of access-to-justice concerns. Effective advocacy on behalf of
consumers, protection of the environment, and other interests that belong
at the same time to no one and to everyone has been found generally to
require more than theefforts of governmental organizations. In politics and
in law, interests cannot be effectively promoted without organizedadvocacy
outside of the government.7' The traditional obstacles to nongovernmental advocacy of group and collective interests, such as barriers to

68 Judgment of Nov. 28, 1978 (Luedicke, BelkaceM, and Koc), Publications of the European Court
of Human Rights, Series A, Vol. XXIX (Koln 1979) 4,25.
69 Judgment of Oct. 9, 1979 (Airey v. Ireland) (supra, note 64) at 15.
70 See, e.g., Johnson/Schwartz, Beyond Payne - The Case for a Legally Enforceable Right to
Representation in Civil Cases for Indigent California Litigants: Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 11(1978)249.
71 See, eig., Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public Interest in Civil
Litigation - A Comparative Study, in: Access to Justice II at 767, 826 et seq.
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no one expects that its importance will decline appreciably in American
civil process. 80
The virtues of class actions have been noted by Continentalscholars, but
adoption of the American-style class action would be hardly conceivable. 81
But in a number of common law countries,notably Australia, Israel and
Great Britain, there has been some activity to revive the importance of this
remnant from equity.
In Australia, a remarkable series of reports examining problems of class
actions, standing, and public interest law generally have been circulated by
the Australian Law Reform Commission, and the proposals favor among
82
other things the expansion of the opportunities for bringing class action.
And in Israel, Stephen Goldstein in 1978 published a long study on the class
action device which is likely to prompt reform proposals from the Ministry
of Justice.83 In England,an important decision of the Chancery Division in

1979, Prudential Assurance Co., Ltd., v. Newman Industries Ltd. 4 may
have signalled a breakthrough in English and perhaps Commonwealth
jurisprudence generally with respect to the class action. 85 While class
actions for damages had been effectively precluded by the requirement that
there be a "joint" or "identical" interest among the members of the class, in
this case the court held that a shareholder class could be represented in a
fraud class action to ascertain whether the defendant would be liable. The
court held that the issue of liability would be decided by a declaratory
judgment that would bind both the members of the class and the defendant;
individual members of the class could then recover their own damages
without having to prove liability. In effect, the only significant difference
between this approach and the American class action for damages is that the
former requires additional action by each individual who claims damages.
The additional actions, however, should be quick and inexpensive, since
the only issue will be the amount of the damages. Of course, it remains to be

seen what impact this English decision will have, but it may provide a key

80 See, e.g., Miller, On Frankestein Monsters and Shining Knights - Myth, Reality, and the
"Class Action Public": Harv. L. Rev. 92 (1978/1979) 664.
81 See, e.g., Kotz, Public Interest Litigation - A Comparative Survey, in: Access to Justice and the
Welfare States (supra, note 3) at 85, 96 et. seq., 112 et. seq.; H. Koch, Kollektiver Rechtsschutz im
ZivilprozeB, Die class action des amerikanischen Rechts und deutsche Reformprobleme (1976); Vigoriti,
Interessi Collettivi e processo (1979).
82 See, e.g., The Law Reform Commission, Access to the Courts I. Standing: Public Interest Suit
(Discussion
Paper No. 4, 1978); II. Class Action (Discussion Paper No. 11, 1979).
8
An article (in Hebrew) by Stephen Goldstein based on- the report was published in Mishpatim 9
(1978) 416. This information as well as a helpful analysis of the British developments came from a letter
of May 13, 1981 from Stephen Goldstein to Mauro Cappelletti.
84 PrudentialAssurance Co., Ltd. v. Newman IndustriesLtd., [198012 W.L.R. 339; [1979] 3 All E.
R. 507.
85 On Class for England generally, see, e.g., Class Actions and Access to Justice: New L. J. 1979, 870;
Bates, A Case for the Introduction of Class Actions into English law: New L.J. 1980, 560.
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precedent for a transformation in the so far relatively little-used
Commonwealth class action device.
b) Organizational Actions on the European Continent
Organizational actions in general are also brought more easily in the
United States than on the European Continent. The rules of standing are
more liberal in the United States and allow the formation of groups for
litigation purposes much in the same manner as the formation of classes.8 6
European courts have been more reluctant to recognize actions by and on
behalf of groups, and the reluctance still dominantes the judicial decisions.
The situation is changing, however. Gone foreover is the era when it was
assumed that the public Ministdre Public and its analogues could
effectively represent the public interest in civil litigation. Case law in
several countries, including the Federal Republic of Germany, the
Netherlands, and Italy is beginning to allow a wider scope for the assertion
of collective interests in court, and the case law has helped to stimulate the
intervention of the legislature along the lines suggested in evolving court
doctrine.
Special standing has increasingly been conferred in Europe on private
organizations to enforce the rights of certain diffuse interests.
Examples of this approach already described in the Florence series
include, in France, the "loi Royer" of 1973 for consumer protection 7 and
the law of 1976 concerning the protection of the environment,8 8 and in
Germany the amendments of 1969 to the 1965 Law Against Unfair
Competition8 9 and the Law of 1976 on Standard Terms of Contract. 90
Recent developments have added to the number of organizations and the
number of laws that can be enforced through this system. In particular,
some German Lander, most notably that of Bremen, have acted to allow
environmental organizations to sue to enforce federal environmental
laws. 91 Austria also has passed an October 1, 1979 law modelled on the
German law on standard terms, 92 and the Netherlands by a law of July 14,
1980 gave consumer groups wider standing to enjoin misleading
advertisement. 93 A number of European developments suggest further
expansion of this approach. The European Community and the Council of
Europe have both emphasized strongly the role of organizations in

16 See Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 23.2 Cappelletti, Vindicating the Public Interest
Through the Courts - A Comparativist's Constribution, in: Access to Justice III at 513.
87 Law of Dec. 27, 1973, no. 73-1193, J.0. 1973, 14139.
88 Law of July 10, 1976, no. 76-629, J.0. 1976, 4203.
89 Law of July 21, 1965, Against Unfair Competition, BGBI. 1635, as amended by Law of June 26,
1969, BGBI. I. 633. For a recent discussion see Ungern-Sternberg, Verbandsklagebefugnis fur
Abmahnvereine?: NJW 1981, 2328.
90 Law of Dec. 9, 1976, on Standard Term of Contract, BGBI. I 3317.
91 Law of Sep. 12, 1979; see Luthge, Die Verbandsklage im Bremischen Naturschutzgesetz: NJW
1980, 1037.
92 See, e.g., Jelinek, Verbandsklage, in: Handbuch zum Konsumentenschutzgesets, ed. by Krejci
(1981); Bajons, L'azione collettiva - Aspetti comparatistici di un nuovo tipo di azione a tutela del
consumatore: Riv. Dir. Civ. 19 (1980) 292; Eccher, Sulla legge austriaca per la tutela dei consumatori:
ibid. 275.
93 See Willems, Civil Litigation and the Public Interest in Dutch Law (unpublished paper for
Cambridge Conference on Civil Litigation and the Public Interest. 1980) 15.
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(and in other important areas,
consumer and environmental protection
94
especially anti-discrimination).
These legislative efforts to confer standing on private organizations
have a number of advantages unavailable to the class action approach.
First, the problem of legitimacy is to a greater extent resolved, since the
organizations that sue must qualify according to statutory criteria, and the
organizations are also accountable to their membership. Class actions, in
contrast, despite the judicial means for monitoring class counsel and class
representatives, may often be primarily the creatures of "entrepreneurial"
attorneys unaccountable either to society generally or to the members of the
class whom the action is supposed to benefit. Second, the European system
strengthens private organizations who, again in contrast to the groups
represented by class actions, will then be able to undertake a number of
strategies, not just litigation. Negotiation, lobbying, and the provision of
information are vital functions in order to, for example, enforce consumer
protection laws and redress the traditional lack of power of consumer
interests. Class actions may sometimes lead to an overemphasis on asserting
interests in court. Such litigation may ultimately be less effective and more
wasteful than negotiation among representative interest groups.
There are also, however, a number of drawbacks associated with a
reliance on private organizations. One is the possibility that only a few
organizations exist able to take advantage of the right to sue. 95 Even with
public subsidies available to certain consumer groups, for example,
virtually all the consumer group actions in the Federal Republic of
Germany have been brought by a very small number of organizations.9 6 A
second and related limitation is that of resources. These organizations may
be unable to afford litigation against large industrial organizations. A
recent study in Germany, for example, found that enforcement actions by
consumer organizations under the law on standard terms of contracts had
generally been brought only against relatively small enterprises.9 7 If the
resources are increased, the problem is that the organization then may become
more or less another branch of the government, with a new set of potential
problems. Third, there is the problem of redressing damages through
organizational actions. In the Federal Republic of Germany, despite reform

94 See, e.g., Comit Economique et Social, La mise on oeuvre et I'harmonisation des moyens
judiciaires et parajudiciaires de la protection des consommateurs dans la communaut6 europ~enne
(Kelkins Report) (1979); Council of Europe, The Collective Interests of Consumers (1980);
Reich/Mcklitz, Consumer Legislation in the EC Countries - A Comparative Analysis (New York
1980). See generally E. von Hippel, Verbraucherschutz in Europa: RabelsZ 45 (1981) 353-376; Rapisarda,
Techniche giudiziali e stragiudiziali di protezione del consumatore - diritto europeo e diritto italiano:
Riv. Dir. Proc. 36 (1981) 685.
95 Under the recent Austrian reform, for example, only six named organizations get standing, and
of those only two are likely to sue. See note 92 supra and accompanying text.
96 Standing was granted to a number of organizations, but only consumer groups had sued. There
were 212 judicial proceedings with consumer group standing from 1977 to Aug. 1, 1980 under the Law
Eine
on Standard Terms of Contract. See, e.g., Bunte, Erfahrunger mit dem AGB-Gesetz -

Zwischenbilanz nach 4 Jahren: AcP 181 (1981) 31, 55; Stillner, Praktische Erfahrungen mit dem AGBGesetz: Z. f. Verbraucherpol. 1980, 142-143.

97 The largest consumer organization, located in Berlin, has a budget of only 100,000 marks for
legal actions. See Bunte (supra, note 96) at 56.
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proposals, consumer organizations can only sue for injunctive relief,98 and
the same is true of the recent Dutch and Austrian reforms. 99 And in France,
where consumer organizations can sue for damages, rhe organizations have
not succeeded in recovering more than the damages they themselves have
suffered - often assessed in a merely symbolic amount - rather than those
suffered by the victims of the illegal practices. 100 It does not appear to date
that consumer organizations, for these reasons, have been successful in
furthering the enforcement in the courts of consumer legislation. Court
actions, however, may serve to complement other strategies such as
negotiation and lobbying. Some environmental groups appear to have been
in some sense more successful, no doubt owing to the fact that it is easier to
mobilize public sentiment and effort against potential threats to the
environment such as nuclear reactors.1 01 The difficulty here, however, with
the legislative formulas for organizational standing is that they tend to
recognize only organizations that have been in existence for a given period
of time. Spontaneous organizations do not receive legal recognition. Again,
this is a problem that may be confronted, but at present it creates a serious
disadvantage of this approach when compared to the liberalized standing
and class actions characterizing the United States.
There has been, then, a fair amount of incremental activity in the representation of diffuse interests. There appears at least to be a consensus that,
in fact, new laws on behalf of diffuse interests cannot be entrusted only
to the traditional organs of enforcement, such as public attorneys general
and Minist~res Publics. Ways must be found to allow private initiative to
supplement public resources, and we are witnessing efforts to adapt the
courts to handle this new kind of litigation. Commentators in Europe, in
the United States, and elsewhere, are increasingly noting that litigation is
undergoing a subtle but important transformation to handle these conflicts
that raise such different problems from private, traditional, two-party
litigation.io 2 In part these changes are a ratification of a trend much beyond
civil procedures. Politics and society are divided into numerous groups who
protect and assert the collective interests of their members, and those groups
should not be prevented from advocacy in court as well as elsewhere for the
rights of their members.
But there also is the point that in order to protect the rights of certain
groups, those we call diffuse interests, special means must be sought to
strengthen the power of the advocates of these interests. Some of the legal
changes may in fact strengthen the power of certain groups, and

98 Proposals to extend the statute to cover actions for damages as well have "met with strong
resistance by the industry." See Kotz, Civil Litigation and the Public Interest (unpublished paper for
Cambridge Conference on Civil Litigation and the Public Interest, 1980).
99 See notes 92 and-93 supra and accompanying text.
100 Malinvaud, La protection des consommateurs: Rec Dalloz 1981, Chron. VIII 49, 61.
101 See, e.g., Willems (supra,note 93) at 12-20 for a number of Dutch examples; Kotz (supra,note 98)
at 26 (noting that "as a consequence of lengthy proceedings in the administrative courts the

construction of both nuclear and conventional power plants has virtually come to R standstill").
102 See, e.g., Cappelle(ti, La protection d'int&ets collectifs et de groupe dans le proc s civil Mtamorphoses de laprocdure civile: Rev. int. dr. comp. 27 (1975) 571; Chayes, The Role of the Judge
in Public Law Litigation: Harv. L. Rev. 89 (1975/76) 1281.
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independent variables, such as fear of nuclear reactors, can also stimulate
activity, but there have been no particularly dramatic recent efforts to add
power to advocates on behalf of diffuse interests. We shall soon learn just
how powerful they are in the United States with the inevitable
confrontations that consumer, environmental, and civil rights advocates
are having with the Reagan administration, which appears to have in large
part abandoned the effort to publicly enforce a number of new laws
designed to protect diffuse interests.
III. The Effort to Go Beyond the Provision of Legal Services:
The "Third Wave" of the Access-to-Justice Movement
Our references to the "third wave" in access-to-justice reform referred to
an increasing willingness to go beyond simply providing legal
representation - whether it be to the poor, diffuse interests, or others - to a
focus on the full panoply of institutions that characterize our dispute
processing systems. Comparative research revealed a number of important
recent reforms that involve, for example, changes in how the courts
function, the development of non-judicial alternatives, especially those
emphasizing conciliation and mediation, and modifications in the legal
profession to make lawyers and non-lawyer advocates more accessible and
effective in enforcing the new rights of ordinary people.
There has continued to be considerable activity in all these areas. The
difficult and important problem of "small claims" is now perceived in a
number of legal systems, and we still are Seeing new efforts and experiments
that address this problem.103 - Another area of importance is the apparent
trend, especially in the United States, toward the "arbitration"of certain
types of claims by voluntary - or comparatively low-paid - attorneys who
make a "decision" that is not in fact binding on the parties.10 4 Each party
may obtain de novo court review, subject only to a proviso in some systems
that if the appealing party obtains in court less than what the arbitrator
proposed, then that party must pay additional costs. Recent efforts to

103 See, generally, Fasching, Small Claims Courts, in: Towards Justice with a Human Face - The
First International Congress on the Law of Civil Procedure, ed. by Storme/Casmen $(Antwerpen and
Deventer 1978) 343; Bourgoignie, L'aide juridique au consomateur (Louvain 1980). On reforms in
Israel, including the establishment of new small claims courts in 1977 and 1979, see Goldstein (supra,
note 83). In England, the experimental London Small Claims Court is no longer in existence, but more
attention is being paid to the court arbitration scheme, which now applies to claims for up to 500; see
Economides, Small Claims and Procedural Justice: Brit J.L. Soc. 7 (1980) 111; Egerton, The Birth and
Death of the London Small Claims Courts: New L.J. 1980, 488; Small Claims PLocedure and the "No
Costs" Rule in the County Court: Law Society's Gaz., March 18, 1981, at 1. See also Turner, Small
Claims and the Cunty Court in England - A Contrast to the Australian Approach: Anglo-Am. L. Rev. 9
(1980) 150. An excellent recent study of the United States Steele, The Historial Context of Small Claims:
Am. Bar Found. Research J. 1981, 292.
104 See generally Rosenberg, Second Class Justice: Windsor YB. of Access to Justice 1 (1981) 294.
The federal experimental arbitrationsystem is described and assessed in Lind/Sharpard,Evaluation of
Court-Annexed Arbitration in Three Federal District Courts (1981). It applies in three federal districts Connecticut, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, and Northern District of California. Three attorney
panels make recommended awards in claims for damages of under 100,000 $ (650,000 $ in
Pennsylvania). The Californiasystem, involving arbitration by single attorney-arbitrators, applies to
claims for less than 15,000 $. It is described in Yakutis, Reform of Civil Procedure - A Quick Look at a
Partial Picture: Cal. State Bar J. 56 (1981) 116.
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implement such an arbitration scheme, which purports to reduce court
congestion, include experiments in several United States federal district
courts and an extensive system in the California state courts. It remains to be
seen just how much such systems in practice can contribute to the reduction
of court congestion, given that more than 90 percent of court cases are
settled out of court in any event in the United States. 105 But a marginal
increase in settlements may ease some of the pressure, especially if time106
consuming, "complex" cases are resolved.
For the purposes of this report, however, we shall emphasize
developments in two areas: the trend toward conciliation, and reforms in the
legal profession. These areas are where some of the most interesting and
important recent changes has been made and are likely to be made in the
near future, and they also can provide data upon which we can base our
concluding remarks. An understanding of the conciliation aspects of the
third wave of reform is indeed especially necessary to an assessment of the
meaning of access to justice today.
1. The Trend Toward Conciliation
There clearly has been a surge of interest in informal "alternatives" to
the courts in recent years. 107 Ordinary courts and lawyers have been
criticized for being too costly and slow to handle the explosion of law
generated by the modern state. They have also been criticized for being illadapted to the particular characteristics of modern disputes. Most disputes,
of course, never reach the courts or even publicly-sponsored alternatives to
the courts. They are usually resolved, as anthropologists have shown, by
doing nothing, by avoiding the party with whom there is conflict, or by
negotiation; and even if the intervention of a "third party" is sought, it is
only in rare instances that a disputant will invoke the assistance of lawyers
and/or the official justice system. 0 8 But the increasing belief appears to be
that, for a variety of reasons, both those informal mechanisms and formal
courts are unable to provide the requisite dispute resolution machinery.
The trend, therefore, is toward methods of processing disputes somewhere
in between the public, formal courts and private, informal methods.
Conciliation or mediation especially characterizes this new reform trend,
which was already becoming apparent at the time of the publication of the
Project series. The dimensions of this trend can be understood best by
focusing on developments in three areas: a) conciliation for interpersonal
neighborhood disputes; b) conciliation for disputes involving the legal
rights of individuals against organizations; and c) conciliation for disputes
involving only the interests of large groups and organizations. As will be
seen, the implications of a conciliation system may be very different for each
of these categories of disputes.
105 See Administrative Office of the United States, Federal Judicial Workload Statistics for the
Twelve Months Period lnding December 31, 1980 (1981) A-20, A-21.
106 Another approach to settling these cases is described in Green/Marks/Olson, Settling Large
Case Litigation - An Alternative Approach: Loy. L.A.L. Rev. 11 (1978) 493.
107 In addition to Florence Project materials, see The Politics of Informal Justice, ed. by A bel (New
York 1981) (two volumes).
108 See, e.g., Merry, Going to Court - Strategies of Dispute Management in an American Urban
Neighborhood: Law and Society Rev. 13 (1979) 891.
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a) Conciliation of Interpersonal or Neighborhood Disputes
A particular aim of recent reformers has been to provide more effective
conciliatory institutions to resolve disputes between or among individuals
who live and work together. The idea, which appears to have united such
diverse groups as police officials, politicians of the left and right, judges,
and anthropologists, is that courts are congenitally ill-suited to such
disputes because of their orientation toward the past, their all-or-nothing
decisions, and their formalism. Alternatives to the courts are seen to be
necessary to attack through conciliation a growing and already important
number of disputes that disrupt normal relationships in the home,
community, school, workplace and the like. Conciliation, it is argued, can
mend broken relationships, look to the future, and maintain community
harmony and peace.
We can begin by recalling several German institutions with an emphasis
on conciliation, such as the Schiedsmann and the ORA (Offentliche
Rechtsauskunft-und Vergleichsstelle) in the Federal Republic of Germany,
which were described in some detail in Florence Project publications. 10 9
Both were concerned to a great extent with interpersonal disputes that
involved relatively minor property violations within the coverage of the
criminal law. Conciliation was also given a very prominent place in the
discussion of the StuttgartModel of German civil procedure," 0 where active
judges resolve most disputes through settlements prior to the final hearing
of the witnesses. These institutional forms have in broad outline been
available at least since the 1920s, when conciliation was the subject of
considerable attention in the German legal literature."' While new
experiments and reform cannot now be pointed to in the Federal Republic,
except perhaps the growth of the Betriebsjustiz in the work setting, the last
couple of years have seen a considerable renewal of interest in alternatives to
the courts and especially in conciliation." 2 Established institutions of
conciliation may be revitalized in the near future or new institutions
developed. We can now question, for example, whether the Schiedsmann is
still a "dying institution," as it appeared to be three years ago."' Indeed, its
experience shows many similarities with the newly created institutions
described below.
109 See Bierbrauer/FaIke/Koch, Conflict and Its Settlement - An Interdisciplinary Study
Concerning the Legal Basis. Function and Performance of the Schiedsmann, in: Access to Justice II at
39; Falke/Bierbrauer/Koch, Legal Advice and the Non-Judicial Settlement of Disputes - A Case Study
of the Public Legal Advice and Mediation Center in the City of Hamburg, in: Access to Justice II at 103.
110 See Bender, The Stuttgart Model; in: Access to Justice II at 431.

ill See, e.g., Blankenburg/Reifner, Condition of Legal and Political Culture Limiting the
Transferability of Access-to-Law Innovations, in: Access to Justice and the Welfare State (supra,note 3)
at 217, 228-243.
112 See, e.g., Metsger-Pregizer,Summary and Consequences for Criminal Policy, in: European
Alternatives to Criminal Trails and Their Applicability in the United States, ed. by Felstiner/Drew

(Washington, D.C., 1978); Jb. I. Rechtssoziologie und Rechtstheorie 6 (1980): Alternative Rechtsformen
und Alternativen zum Recht, ed. by Blakenburg/ Kiausa/Rottleuthner;Gottwald, Streitbeilegung ohne

Urteil, Vermittelnde Konfliktregelung in den Vereinigten Staaten aus rechtsvergleichender Sicht (1981);
ders., Alternativen zum zivilen Justizverfahren: Z. I. Rpol. 1982, 28.
113 Cf. Rohl, Vorschlag fur einen Modellversuch zur Regelung von kleinen Streitfallen zwischen
Verbrauchern und Waren- und Dienstleistungslieferanten (1980) 14, 129, 175, 259; Seetzen, Entlastung
der Ziviljustiz durch Vorschaltung des Schiedsmanns?: DRiz 1980, 177-180; Schulte, Zur Erweiterung der
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France has perhaps an even longer tradition of conciliatory justice,
reflected in such Revolutionary reforms as the juge du paix, and there, too,
has -been a considerable revival of the earlier emphasis. 1 4 Most notable for
the resolution of interpersonal or neighborhood disputes is the
conciliateur,in part designed to fill the gap left by the abolishment of the
juges du paix in 1958.115 After a one-year experimental period commencing
in 1977, the institution of conciliateur was extended by statute to all French
ddpartements. Although this institution was described briefly in Access-toJustice reports, we can now provide some data on the early experience of
conciliateurs, of whom there were already one thousand by the end of
1980.186 In addition, several notable statutory changes were made in 1981 in
response to the early experience." 7 Individual conciliateurs, nominated by
the Premiers Pr6sidents of the Cours d'appeal, have thus far tended to be
retired men (although the number of women is growing), especially from
the professions connected to the administration of justice or public
administration. 1 8 With a couple of exceptions (Bordeaux, Aix) the
caseloads have been rather small - between 200 and 500 "affaires" per year
per Cour d'appel, or something like 30 per year per conciliateur (although
the great disparities among conciliateurs make the average somewhat
misleading). Many kinds of disputes have been brought to conciliateurs,
including landlord-tenant, consumer, neighborhood,.and family matters. A
good portion of the work of conciliateurs, in addition, is simply to provide
legal advice, helping to provide the advice still largely unavailable under
the French legal aid system. It is too early to say whether conciliateurs have
thus far been a "successful" institution; indeed, we cannot easily specify
what the criteria for success are at this point. Conciliateurs appear, however,
to have been able to promote resolution of most disputes that are brought to
them. 119 Also, as will be seen from the discussion below, they have
experienced many of the same problems and dilemmas that have been seen
elsewhere with local conciliation, including in Germany and the United
States. The potential and problems of this important new institution 3,000 conciliateurs are contemplated in France - can be assessed better after
a discussion of some of its other comparative counterparts. It will suffice
here to emphasize the notable resurgence of this type of conciliation in
France.
In the United States, the various governments became interested in
conciliation at about the same time as the French government developed its
interest. In both countries the idea at first captured the imagination of the
highest executive official concerned with judicial matters - the French
sachlichen Zustandigkeit der Vergleichsbehorde, insbesondere des Schiedsmannes: Schiedsmann Z51
(1980) 28-44.
114 See generally Bourgoignie (supra, note 103) at 341-346.
115 See, e.g. Bellet, Les conciliateurs en France, in: Les conciliateurs 37.; JobertlRozenblatt; (supra,
note*); Faucher, R6flexions sur les conciliateurs: Gaz. Pal. 1978, Doctr. 631. Developments can be
followed in the Rev. trim. d'information des conciliateurs.
116 See Jobert/Rozenblattat Rbsum6 p.1; Bellet (supra,note 115) at 5.
117 Most interesting of the May 1981 modification was the specification that the conciliateur's
assistance can be invoked by judicial authorities as well as a'private person, and the clarification that an
agreement can be given executory force by a juge d'instance if the parties so agree.
118 The information in this paragraph is taken from JobertlRozenblatt at 25, 26, 44.
119 Jobert/Rozenblatt at 80-81.
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Garde des Sceaux and the United States Attorney General - and nationally
funded experimentation then began. The French experimented with
conciliateurs in four d~partements and the Americans with three
NeighborhoodJustice Centers, one each in Los Angeles, Kansas City, and
Atlanta. Each experiment was proclaimed a success by its sponsors, 120 and
legislation followed to implement the new scheme nationwide. Like the
French in 1978, the United States government in 1980 enacted a new law,
called the "Dispute Resolution Act."' 2 ' This Act was to set up a Dispute
Resolution Center to help fund further experiments and provide research
data and technical assistance focusing on "minor disputes," "consumer
mechanisms," "housing mechanisms," and "small claims mediation."
Unlike in France, however, national policy in the United States did not
continue to the implementation stage. No funds have yet been appropriated
for the Dispute Resolution Center, and it does not appear that any will be in
the near future. That reluctance, however, appears to be more a reflection of
the current federal stinginess and the new emphasis on decentralized
pluralism of the American political system than a waning of support for the
conciliation alternative. Indeed, it was somewhat odd that a national policy
did appear to be evolving about this especially local type of judicial or
quasi-judicial institution. Not surprisingly, activity has now concentrated
more on the local level, even if there is still some federal interest in spurring
local experiments. A recent article on the conciliation-oriented dispute
resolution centers in the United States reported that 50 were set up in 1980,
bringing the total to 140.122 The federal government, through an Urban
Crime Prevention Program, has further contributed to the expansion by
helping this year to fund eleven new programs in seven cities. 12 - Several
empiral studies are now available in the United States concerning
Neighborhood Justice Centers, including the official evaluations of the Los
Angeles, Atlanta, and Kansas City Centers. 124 As in France and Germany, it
is notable here that caseloads of the Justice Department experimental
Centers were also relatively small and diverse. The Kansas City and Los
Angeles Centers had only 1600 cases between them in the fifteen month
experimental period, and the 2,351 Atlanta cases are in great part the result
of referrals from the regular courts. 2 5 These Centers, however, did have
considerable success in resolving the disputes that reached them. About 65
percent of cases were "resolved", according to the official evaluation, which
concluded that the Centers "provide a needed and effective alternative
26
mechanism for the resolution of minor disputes."'

120 For France, see Faucher (suora. note 115). For the United States see Cook/RoehI/Sheppard.

121 Pub: L. No. 96-190, 94 Stat. 17 (1980).
122 Dispute Mediation Up Despite Funding Worries: Am.B.Ass.J. 67 (1981) 294. For a list of the
institutions, see American Bar Association, Directory of Dispute Resolution Programs (1981).
123 See "Eleven Community-Based Madiation Programs Funded": Dispute Resolution, Spring
1981, p. 1 (periodical published by the American Bar Association Special Committee on Resolution of
Minor Disputes).
124 See Cook/Roehl/Sheppard/Felstiner/Williams,Community Mediation in Dorchester, Mass.
(1980).
125 Cook/Roehl/Sheppart at 1314.

126 Cook/Roehl/Sheppard at. 2.
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Other countries have also begun to discuss and experiment with new
conciliatory institutions. In Australia, New South Wales has created several
"Community Justice Centers," and the Australian Federal Attorney
General has indicated an interest in developing more such institutions in
Australia. 27 There are several experiments in Canada, and the first
National Workshop on Dispute Mediation was held in Saskatoon,
Saskatchewan, in April 1981.128 Further evidence of interest is the fact that
several national and international organizations, including the
International Association of Legal Science and the Italian Association for
the Study of the Law of Civil Procedure, dedicated their recent meetings to
2 9
the subject of conciliation.1
The trend toward conciliation, especially of disputes in the home,
community, and workplace, has clearly gained considerable momentum
and attention in the Western world, and that is of course not surprising. It
confirms the growing recognition that regular courts and court procedures
are inappropriate to resolve neighborhood and other interpersonal
disputes. And, although we are emphasizing new developments in this
paper, we should note that this growing recognition is not limited to the
Western developed countries described above; it is well-established in
Japan3 0 and typical of a number of Socialist countries,'8 ' most notably
China,132 and of much of the Developing countries as well. 33 Very diverse
societies have found it necessary to foster conciliatory institutions as
complements to or as alternatives to the courts.
The potential advantages of conciliation for these common kinds of
disputes are by now well-understood, especially the capacity to examine a
dispute in its entirety, not merely its legal dimension; the possibility to
shape a solution that need not be victory for one, loss for the other; and the
opportunity to make an adjustment that permits harmony and coexistence
for the future, not simply a decision as to who in the past was right and
wrong.'3 4 Individuals who live and work together after all must coexist, and
127 See, e.g., Schwartzkoff, Community Mediation in New Sourth Wales -

Plans and Prospects

(1980); Mediation and Backyard Justice: Reform 1981, 5 (a periodical publication of the Australian'Law
Reform Commission).
128 Reported in "Betting on the Resources of Dispute": Dispute Resolution, Spring 1981, at 8.
129 For the meeting of the International Association of Legal Science see Les conciliateurs(supra,
note*); see also Kotz/Zajtay, Rev.int.dr.comp. 1981, 1036-1040, and ii RabelsZ 46(1982) 177-182. For the
1979 meeting of the Italian Association see the general report of Denti, I procedimenti non giudiziali di
conciliazione come istituzioni alternative: Riv. Dir. Proc. 35 (1980) 410. See also Cappelletti,Appunti su
conciliatore e conciliazione: Riv. Trim. Dir. Proc. Civ. 35 (1981) 49.

130 See Kojima/Taniguchi, Access to Justice in Japan, in: Access to Justice I at 687, 717-727. See
also for an elaboration of the argument that the Japanese are not so nonlitigious, Haley, The Myth of
the Reluctant Litigant: J. Jap. Stud. 4 (1978) 359.
131 See, e.g., Kurczewski/Frieske,The Social Conciliatory Commissions in Poland, A Case Study of
Non-Authoritative and Conciliatory Dispute Resolution as an Approach to Access to Justice, in: Access
to Justice II at 153.
132 Of particular interest is Sheng Yu, Le syst~me de conciliation populaire en R~publique
Populaire d Chine, in: Les conciliateurs 27.
133 See, e.g., M'Baye, Le rfglement des litiges en dehors des tribunaux: le cas de l'Afrique, in: Les
conciliateurs 17.; Marasinghe,The Use of Conciliationfor Dispute study of an effort to use conciliation
to transform society in a developing country, see Spence, Institutionalizing Neighborhood Courts Two Chilean Experiences: Law and Society Rev. 13 (1979) 139.
134 See, e.g, Shonholtz, A Justice System that Isn't Working and Its Impact on the Community (San
Francisco Community Board Program 1981, unpublished); Dispute Mediation (supra, note 122). See
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conciliation can be an effective tool to resolve conflicts that cannot be
settled by the parties themselves but are inappropriate for judicial action.
The major critique of conciliation generally is that it promotes unfair
results when attempted among parties of unequal bargaining power, but
that criticism does not apply to much of this interpersonal conciliation.
The problem of inequality of bargaining power may have some relevance
here, but our analysis is facilitated by limiting discussion in this context to
institutions designed for individuals - family members, neighbors,
coworkers. There are several other issues, however, that merit some
attention at this point.
The first problem common to these interpersonal conciliation agencies
is their independence, i. e. determining how independent these agencies
should be from regular court systems. In one sense this is a question of how
much one wants a conciliation agency to be a genuine alternative to regular
courts and court procedures. If the aim is merely a cheaper or faster version
of the regular courts, it is logical to link the agency closely to the court
system. If,on the other hand, the aim is to develop a different kind or quality
of justice, then it appears desirable to separate the institution as much as
possible from the courts, to maximize local participation, and to allow the
program to evolve in a somewhat autonomous direction. The trend in the
American Neighborhood Justice Centers appears to be in the direction of
local participation and autonomy, but the issue has certainly not been
resolved. 135 In France, where the conciliateurs are linked to the court system
at least through the system of appointment, the issue of independence is
also very much a live one. 136 According to the recently-published CREDOC
study of the conciliateurs:
«Du cot6 des conciliateurs deux opinions coexistent: celle de ceux qui souhaitent la plus
totale independence par rapport au syst~me judiciaire, ce qui nexclut pas
6ventuellement une certaine cooperation, et celle de ceux qui, au contraire, aspirent A
une plus grande integration pouvant aller jusqu'6 une modification de leur mission
37
actuelle.,1

One aspect of ifidependence, it should be noted, depends very much on
the existence of the court system as a possible and accessible alternative. It
requires that disputants be given a choice between two kinds of justice, the
regular courts and conciliation, but there will be no real choice if the regular
courts are too expensive and slow. Disputants may then go to conciliation
only because they believe it might offer them a remedy that they would like
but cannot obtain from the courts. 38 For conciliation to be a real
alternative, it is necessary for disputants to be able freely to choose between
two types of justice.

also McGiUis/Mullen, Neighborhood Justice Center 135See, e.g., Cook/Roehl/Sheppard.
136

An Analysis of Potential Models (1977) 47-49.

Note that the statute was amended to ensure that court referrals would be permitted, thus

tending to enhance the ties to the courts. See note 115, supra.
137 See Jobert/Rozenblatt at 103.
138 Professor Taniguchi suggests that litigants in Japan often choose conciliation for this reason.

See Taniguchi, Extra-Judicial Disputes Settlement in Japan, in: Les conciliateurs 109.
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A closely related issue is the role of the law in these conciliatory
institutions. Here, too, the analysis depends largely on whether we want the
conciliatory institution to be an extension of the regular court and police
system or to be independent and autonomous from that system. And again
opinion is divided.1 3 9 It is clear, however, on the basis of several empirical
studies that under normal circumstances French conciliateurs and the like
cannot operate effectively without at least some knowledge of the law that
would apply to the disputes that they seek to resolve. 4 0 The conciliator who
tries to promote a reasonable agreement will make reference to the law in at
least two ways: first, as one reflection of a possibly "moral" or "just"
approach to a given dispute; and second, and perhaps more importantly, as
an indication of what might happen if the dispute is not resolved amicably
and ends up in court. The ultimate solution of conciliation need not of
course be consistent with the law, but the law is one factor considered in
promoting an acceptable and fair settlement. 4' Lay conciliators will not
become legal experts in many areas of the law, but they do need some
acquaintance with at least those areas of law where they face recurring
problems and where there is a background of legal policy.
Given the necessity for some familiarity with the law, we return to the
question of how much the conciliated result should resemble the "legal"
one. There are conflicting views, as we have noted. In her recent report on
conciliation in China, for example, Sheng Yu insists that its role is to
enforce the law in the spirit of equity - in essense to persuade the
population to comply with the law. 42 Conciliators are quick to detect
transgressions and seek ways of promoting behavior consistent with legal
norms. Those norms in turn embody a desire for social change. For
example, a good portion of Chinese conciliation helps persuade husbands
to respect the new rights of their wives.
A recent report on conciliation in Senegal by Premier President (Chief
Justice) M'Baye makes a similar analysis of the relationship between
conciliatory justice and social change in some developing countries.14 3
Conciliators need not follow the precise letter of new laws and regulations,
but the process helps to maintain a dialogue between the new norms of a
changing society and strongly embedded legal traditions. The law is not
resisted, but it is enforced in such a manner that continuity with tradition
can be maintained. It eases the shock of laws aimed at transforming society.
The proponents of independent conciliation, however, have suggested
that it can, and in certain societies should, offer resistance to the law and
social control of the state.'" The modern industrialized state, they argue, is

139 See, e.g, Jobert/Rozenblattat 75-76 (describing divided opinion among French conciliateurs).
140 See ii, Bierbrauerei at. (supra,note 109) at 87 ("75.2 percent [of Schiedsmanner] regarded itas
very important for bringing about a just settlement that they knew the legal aspects that would
determina the outcome of a private criminal action before the court").
141Cf. Mnookin/Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law - The Case of Divorce: yale
L. J. 81 (1978/79) 950.
142 See Sheng Yu (suora. note 132).
143See M'Baye (supra, note 133. See also Marasinghe(supra, note 133).
144 Cf. Shonholtz (subra, note 134).
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one of centralism, bureaucratism, and a great proliferation of law and legal
regulation into people's everyday affairs. Community dispute resolution
45
may help to conserve and even revive local, "indigenous"' norms that not
only help people to live and work together peacefully and fruitfully but also
enable them to resist the invasion of the state. Thus Kurczewski and Frieske
concluded on the basis of their empirical study of "social conciliatory
commissions" in Poland that participants and the general public favored a
"self-government-in- the-administration-of-justice" approach to
conciliation. 14 6 And more recently, Kurczewski hypothesized that a certain
recent decline in these commissions stems in part from the government's
failure 4to7 encourage the kind of independence and autonomy that the public
favors.
In short, a large number of thoughtful proponents of conciliation in
both Europe and North America argue for the necessity of decentralized,
independent, voluntary institutions capable of building local unity at the
same time they resolve disputes through conciliation.
Some would objet even to these voluntary, autonomous institutions on
the grounds that they, too, promote a social control inconsistent with
individualprivacy.14 8 It should be admitted that objection has some validity
to it. Even if conciliation is voluntary, it is clear that the institutions will be
able to assert a certain amount of social pressure, and they will certainly be
involved with disputes that Would otherwise never have been brought to
such institutions. Relatively minor disputes that might have been forgotten
may now be magnified and transformed into more serious matters.
Many thus argue that these minor disputes are best resolved by
"avoidance.' 4 9 if not "negotiation," and that may be true. If your
neighbor's child tramples your flowers, you may prefer to build a fence
rather than turn the incident into a disruptive controversy. The problem,
however, is that for many people such fences cannot be built. They are
thrown together in housing, school, and work, and if negotiations fail, the
dispute will fester and disrupt life and work. Moreover, if disputes do
become disruptive, we can expect the modern state to step in with the
official machinery of justice.
The choice in many places therefore may not be the idealized one
between privacy and neighborhood justcice, but rather may be between
social control by the state or by some locally-controlled form of
neighborhood justice. This local, decentralized, participatory form of
neighborhood justice for interpersonal disputes thus has a number of
advantages. Its proponents hope to revitalize home and work communities,
build local strength, and help to resist the centralizing, bureaucratic
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excesses of the modern state. Conciliation institutions designed with that
orientation may indeed be able to offer a helpful corrective both to the
inherent deficiencies of ordinary court systems and to the excesses of the
modern state.
One problem, however, is whether even well-designed social
experiments along these lines will really take hold among those whom they
are supposed to serve. The one experimentl Neighborhood Justice Center
that sought especially to pursue the independent model - Los Angeles, or
more precisely Venice/Mar Vista Center - has had a very small caseload
indeed. It dealt with 751 cases over the fifteen month experimental period,
only about half of which were initiated by the disputants themselves.15 0 As
the French data confirm, the caseloads of such institutions have been small
generally, 51 not just in the United States, and it may be very difficult to
attract a sufficient clientele without court and police referrals. Court
referrals, however, tend to push the institutions toward a position
subsidiary to the courts and the official legal system. It remains to be seen, in
short, whether this experiment with conciliation will succeed in
addressing the problems of excessive bureaucracy, legalization, and
centralization. If it does not, we must now ask what the result will be of a
proliferation of such institutions. It may very well be an extension of the
law and power of the state, even if moderated somewhat by the reliance on a
conciliatory form of justice. These alternatives to the court clearly can serve
several disparate social goals.
This legalization or delegalization of interpersonal disputes raises a
number of issues, but the issues are even more complicated concerning
conciliation of disputes involving an individual on one side and a business
or organization on the other. We must analyze the conciliatory approach to
those kinds of disputes, and then to disputes between or among
organizations, before we make any effort to asses this general trend.
b) The Consumer Problem
By the "consumer problem" we refer to disputes that may arise between
individuals on the one hand and organizations, such as businesses and
governments, on the other." 2 The modern welfare state in Western societies
has been characterized by a great extension of law into such typical unequal
relationships as buyer-merchant, borrower-lender, employee-employer,
environmentalist-polluter, and tenant-landlord. The Florence Project
discussion of the access-to-justice movement gave particular attention to
this problem and to approaches purporting to confront it, including legal
aid and public interest representation. Conciliation is now increasignly
being advocated as a means to promote inexpensive, quick, and amicable
resolutions of disputes between unequal parties.

150 See Cook/RoehIlSheppard at 1-14.
151 See generally Felstiner/Williams (supra, note 124) at XI, 46-47; Jobert/Rozenblatt at 43-44;
Bierbraueret al. (supra, note 109) at 47-49, It is interesting to compare the enormous caseloads generated
immediawtely by new public legal aid offices. See Garth (supra,note 49) at 166-167.
152 This terminology is used also by Steele (supra, note 103) at 320.
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While our discussion of Neighborhood Justice Centers, conciliateurs,
Schiedsmainner, and the like focused on interpersonal disputes, it is
nevertheless clear that a good portion of their caseloads included disputes
that do involve the claims or defenses of consumers generally against organizations. 153 In the United States, the data on Neighborhood Justice Centers, in
fact, suggest further that individuals are more likely to bring exactly these kinds
of disputes to the Centers rather than interpersonal disputes. Thus, "The
Venice/Mar Vista NJC caseload was dominated by disputes of a civil nature
between landlords and tenants, consumers and merchants, and employees
and employers."' 54 These disputes thus seem to be treated in the same
manner as those which involve just individuals or parties of equal
bargaining power.
Other conciliatory mechanisms, however, have been designed recently
for these disputes involving unequals, and they may represent a different
approach. Specialized institutions such as the "Public Complaints Board",
established first in Sweden and now found in all the Nordiccountries,155 the
"boite postale 5000" system for consumer complaints in France;156 and
some more general institutions such as small claims courts, 157 seek to
combine conciliation with an effort to overcome disparities in legal
knowledge and bargaining power.
The Recommendation of the Council of Europe of spring 1981, noted
earlier, 158 could promote a whole range of reforms in the field of access, but
what is notable here is that the Ministers have also emphasized the virtues of
conciliation ("increased recourse to an amiable resolution"). The
European Economic Community is similarly working on a Community
model for small claims and consumer disputes. 159 These efforts will
possibly be significant, but we cannot yet know how to characterize them.
They may look like Neighborhood Justice Centers or like more specialized
institutions, or they may result in new models.
Given this activity and the prospects for further reform, a critical
questions that now must be addressed is whether the emphasis on
conciliation in these settings, even if promoting inexpensive and quick
access, represents a retreat from the effort to enforce new laws that bolster
the power and rights of consumers.
There is evidence that general conciliatory institutions such as
Neighborhood Justice Centers do not perform well with these consumer
problems, 60 even if they may help to "resolve" disputes. In an informal

153 See, e.g. jobert/Rozenblatt at 43.50.

See Cook/Roehi/Sheppard at 13.
See Mangard, Le r~glement des litiges des consommateurs, in: Ministkre de l'Economie, Le
pouvoir kconomique des consommateurs (1980).
156 See generally Bourgoignie (supranote 103) at 341-346; CappellettilGarth(supra,note 9) at 9599.
157 See ii at 69-84; Steele (supra, note 103) at 347-357.
158 See supra, note 4, and inlra, p. 184.
159 See generally Rohl (supra,note 113)..
160 According to Cook/Roehl/Sheppardat 12, "Interpersonal disputes were more likely to reach a
hearing than civil cases and were more apt to be resolved via mediation or conciliation; half of the
interpersonal disputes were mediated. In contrast, only 23% of the civil cases reached a hearing but many
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setting, with no credible threat of coercion by the weaker party, the party
with the greater bargaining power tends to come out better. The other patty
may not even know of his or her rights. A generally trained lay conciliator
can probably provide little help in these rather technical areas, and a party
with more power is able to rely on that power. In this sense the third wave, as
Sarat points out, can be seen as "a retreat from the commitments and
possibilities of the first two." 6' There is no doubt that many who favor the
third wave in a number of countries favor just such a retreat. Neighborhood
Justice Centers and the like may promote social control and the extension of
some law, but we may get only the social control where conciliation is tried
among parties of unequal bargaining power.
But that need not be the case. If, for example, strong consumer,
employee, or tenant organizations exist, or other effective advice agencies
serve the same purpose, they can ensure at least that the individual obtains
appropriate advice and assistance. The individual then will not settle
without some awareness of the law that would be applied, and often an
interested organization can supply the added resources to make a lawsuit a
credible threat. Second, as noted before, if there are otherwise available real
and accessible alternative means to enforce the rights effectively, then
conciliation will necessarily take place against that bargaining background. 162 The conciliated result may then end up being a means to enforce
the spirit of new law while maintaining and ongoing relationship. This
can be especially useful for tenant-landlord or employee-employer
problems, for example. It may, in fact, be more effective than would be a
court decision. It is thus notable that in Sweden, where the welfare state
ideology of law enforcement is still secure, 63 the consumer protection
system is designed so that consumers can choose either the route of the
reformed small claims court, where the decision is binding, or the Public
Complaints Board, where it is not.164
Sweden's system illustrates another point; informal, conciliatory justice
need not be the domain only of lay conciliators uninformed in the law and
spirit of the new consumer or tenant rights. Specially-trained conciliators,
whether formally lawyers or not, can develop and expertise sufficient to see
that for at least one class of claims the litigants can be made aware of the
implications of the law. It appears indeed that in the People's Republic of
China the conciliators are well versed in the law.165 With different political
aims, but with the same idea of using law as an instrument for state
sponsored change, the Chinese also use conciliation to enforce the law.

others were resolved prior to a hearing." Cf. Ruhnka, Housing Justice in Small Claims Court (1979)
109-119 (on problems in small claims courts with landlord-tenant disputes and the law);
Ruhnka/Weller/Martin, Small Claims Court - A National Examination (1978) 195-196 (on some
problem re: small claims generally).
161 Sarat (supra, note 22) at 1919.
162 See notes 139-142 and accompanying text supra.
163 In professor Ekelofs review of Access to Justice (supra, note 7), for example, the author urges
that the "mediator ought to get as good as possible an idea of the legal position before making advice."
164 See generally Einstein, The Swedish Public Complaints Board - Its Vital Role in a System of
Consumer Protection, in: Access to Justice II at 491.
165 See Sheng Yu (supra, note 103).
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Finally, as Eric Steele points out in a recent study of small claims in the

United States, 66 a balanced assessment of conciliation as part of an entire
legal system requires us to consider which cases are being dealt with in
aggregate ways rather than through individual actions. We obviously will
be less concerned with how laws .are enforced in the conciliation setting
involving the individual and the organization if compliance with the law is
fostered through other means, such as public prosecutions or class or group
actions. However much we see theoretical problems in Neighborhood
Justice Centers that handle housing and consumer disputes, for example, it
may be that as a practical matter the real conflicts and the enforcement of
social policies involving such groups are focused elsewhere. Here, too, the
third wave does not dictate one or another political outcome.
c) Conciliation Between or Among Interest Groups and Organizations
A report on the trend toward conciliation should also consider the
development of institutions that seek to resolve disputes between various
organizations or groups. This use of conciliation is related closely to the
general tendency, regardless of state intervention, for groups of more or less
67
equal bargaining power to negotiate and resolve their conflicts amicably.1
The history of labor relations in almost any country after the growth of
unions certainly illustrates this tendency. 68 That history also shows that
for socially important conflicts such as labor-management, incidents of
government, intervention tend to be through conciliation or mediation
rather than through law and litigation. There are strong reasons for this
tendency, some of which were mentioned before. To reiterate, such complex
disptites cannot often be resolved effectively through an all-or-nothing
approach; there is a necessity for the relationship to continue; and the
resolution of the dispute must look toward subtle mutual adjustments in
future behavior. Law and the regular courts have not been well-suited
toward the resolution of such disputes.' 69
These reasons are now being asserted for non-labor disputes, such as those
which require a balancing of interesis related to the protection of the environment. Litigation in this field may be .slow and wasteful and it may involve
"phony issues" based on procedural details rather than on the real questions of
policy. 70 the administrative process may put an end to conflict in some
disputes, but if it does not, the concern must be whether judges are
appropriate agencies for balancing the interests and framing a decree. It is
true, as Professor Chayes suggests, that American federal judges in "public
law" litigation have often come to adopt a role resembling more a

166 See Steele (supra note 103).
167 This phenomenon is described by Galanter, Why the "Haves"

Come Out Ahead Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change: Law and Society Rev. 9 (1974) 95, 110-114.
I"8 See generally the data reported in the National Reports to the Access-to-Justice Project, cited in
Cappelleti/Garth (supra, note 9) at 167 and notes 341-342.
169 See Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law: Mod. L. Rev. 37 (1974) 1.
170 See L.M. Friedman, Claims Disputes, Conflicts and the Modern Welfare State, in: Access to
Justice and the Welfare States (supra, Note 103) at 251, 264.
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conciliator than a judge as traditionally envisioned. 171 But this judicial role
is not universally admired or appreciated, 172 and it tends to come at or near
the end of a long and expensive litigation process. There has therefore been
an effort, pioneered in the United States through a Ford Foundation
sponsored program at the University of Washington, to make available
mediators to help settle environment conflicts out of court. 73 The office of
Environmental Mediation in Washington has reportedly been very
1 74
successful in this task.
Here, too, however, we must be cautious. The Washington organizers
emphasize that this mediation or conciliation cannot be separated from
litigation and other coercive means of handling such conflicts:
.'Mediation' is a specific approach to resolving conflicts and is useful in a limited
number of situations... [T]here is an expectation on the part of observers that mediation
will replace litigation. However, litigation will continue to be a necessary element in

establishing the relative power required to achieve meaningful negotiations and, while
actual litigation may be avoided in some situations, the potential must remain."'

75

In other words, a balance of power is necessary for mediation to succeed,
and to date the threat of litigation has been a necessary element in
establishing such a balance - at least in the environmental field.
Conciliation may be a superior way to resolve these complex collective
conflicts, but with no balance of power it may simply turn into a way of
neglecting the interests of the less powerful. Again our discussion of the
third wave leaves us with a sense of its ambiguity. What is important is the
legal and social background against which conciliation takes place.
2. Changes in the Legal Profession
While we have emphasized changes in the style and structure of dispute
processing institutions such as courts and quasi-courts, of increasing
importance are also changes within the organization of the legal
profession.
Recent changes in the legal profession of the United States have been
prompted by the Supreme Court's liberalizing decisions in cases such as
Goldfarb,176 attacking minimum fee lists; Bates,t77 permitting advertising;

Chayes (supr, note 102).
172 Compare Chayes (supra, note 102) and Diver, The Judge as Political Powerbroker Superintending Structural Change in PUblic-Law Litigation: Va.L.Rev. 65 (1979/80) 43; Horowitz,
The Courts and Social Policy (1977).
173See generally, Roundtable Justice Case Studies in Conflict Resolution, kReports to the Ford
Foundation, ed. by Goldman (1980).
174 See Dembart/Kwartler, The Snoqualmie River Conflict Bringing Mediation into
Environmental Disputes, in: Roundtable Justice (supra, note 173) at 39; Cormick, Resolving
Environmental Conflicts Through Mediation - Experience, Process and Potentials (unpublished
paper presented to American Sociological Association, Annual Meeting, September 7, 1978, San
Francisco).
175Roundtable Justice (supra, note 173) at 17.
176 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
177Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
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78 allowing solicitation in the public interest. These cases
and Primus,1
illustrate a growing trend, also being felt elsewhere, to hold the profession
up to public scrutiny and force changes in the profession's traditional way
of doing things. -In the United Kingdom, in particular, Royal
Commissions for England and Wales and for Scotland have reported
somewhat critically on many of the profession's traditional practices, 179 and
some changes will probably be made in response to this challenge,
including some in the field of advertising. i 0 -The Federal Republic of
Germany has now began to discuss these issues as well. There already in
German case-law suggesting some right to publicity by lawyers,' s and it may
even be, as one German commentator opined, that the heralded recent
Sunday Times "free speech" decision18 2 of the European Court of Human
Rights will put further pressure on the Federal Republic and other
participants in the European Convention to modify some of their
83

practices. 1

There seems to be an interesting convergence of two factors that
promote increasing awareness and change in the legal profession: First,
public scrutiny has come in part from the development of a kind of "legal
needs" approach which has been associated also with the access-to-justice
movement. Lawyers and policymakers note that people with problems that

18 4
have a legal dimension do not very frequently consult a lawyer.
Therefore, there has been a search for ways, including of course more legal
aid, to bring down the obstacles to consulting a lawyer. The prohibition of

advertising is especially seen as a barrier that inhibits the intelligent choice

of a lawyer and, to some extent in the United States at least, lessens price
competition that will increase accessibility. A second factor that works to
promote measures to increase the use of legal services is simply the increase
in the number of lawyers. Virtually all Western countries have recently
experienced a tremendous increase in the number of persons in the legal

profession.8 5 While one cannot easily separate the relative contribution of
this pressure and the access-to-justice concerns mentioned before, there is
no doubt that this factor enhances the attractiveness to lawyers of many of
these reforms. Other efforts to bring lawyers and potential clients together
include the continuing developments in the provision of group and
178 In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
179 See, supra, note.*

180 See the prognosis of Zander, Commission Examines English Legal Profession: Am. B. Ass. J. 66
(1980) 568, 569. See also Marshall,Lawyers and the Public - Time for Reform?: Law Society's Gaz., Oct.
8, 1981, at 1089. The Law Society has already embarked on a greatly expanded advertising campaign
emphasizing the need to see lawyers before problems go too far and the availability of legal aid. Full-page
advertisements, for example, rain in such newspapers as the Daily Mail from May to July 1980, at a cost
of 350,000. See Law Society Advertising Campaign: Law Society's Gaz., May 14, 1980, at 472.
181 See, e.g., BVerfG May 13, 1981, BVerfGE 57, 121. Generally Brangsch, Spezialisierung und
Werbung im Bereich des Anwaltsberufs: NJW 1980, 1818; Pietzke, Standesrechtliche
Wettbewerbsverbote des Rechtsanwats in den USA und in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland:
GRUR/Int. 1979, 147; see also the report on "Tagung fur Rechtsvergleichung 1981" by Basedow et al.,
RabelsZ 46 (1982) 168-176 (168-170).
182 The Sunday Time [1979] YB. Human Rights 22 (1979) 40.
183 See Brangsch (supra, note 177).
184 See Garth (supra, note 49) at 1-13.
185See, e.g., Royal Commission at 24 (from tables on the growth there); Zur wirtschaftlichen
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prepaid legal service plans in both the United States and Europe,8 6 and
there is no doubt that similar innovations in the profession will progress
further in coming years. As we have suggested before, however, changes
such as an increase in legal advertising or even a reduction in the cost of
legal services, while helpful, do not address the real access-to-justice
problems of disadvantaged groups and diffuse interests. The history of the
movement has indeed been one of going much beyond subsidized lawyers.
Nevertheless, the current ferment in the legal profession must continue to
be examined and discussed, for it illustrates one undeniably important
feature of the emerging situation - lawyers (in addition to the judicial
system generally) are increasingly being evaluated by the standard of how
they serve the public interest, including how they promote or retard access
to justice.
IV. Access to Justice Today
We have described widespread developments in legal service for the poor
(and in fact legal services generally), in the representation of diffuse and
collective interests, and in an effort to go beyond traditional courts and court
procedures to a "warmer way" of disputing 8 7 At the risk of
oversimplifying, we can suggest that the last three years or so have not seen
many "pro-active" reforms that, for example, became institutionalized as
neighborhood law firms, lawyers' collectives, public interest law firms, and
the like. Such institutions seek to reach out to individuals and bring them
within the legal system to assert and vindicate their rights. The last three
years have been characterized more by an emphasis on alternatives to the
court, and especially on conciliatory mechanisms applied to a variety of
types of disputes.
It is tempting to argue, as Sarat has done, that this recent emphasis
implies a negation of waves one and two. We no longer are trying to
mobilize individuals and groups to enforce and extend their rights. Rather,
we are trying to curb the explosion of rights through conciliation and
diversion from courts. As we have suggested, however, that scenario need
not be the case,' and our conclusion here will reiterate and expand on that
observation.
Situation der Anwaltee: DRiZ 1980, 43; Abel, Legal Services: What Are the Problems?, in: Frontiers of
Applied Sociology, ed. by Holt et al. (New York 1982).
186 See Cappelletti/Garth (supra, note 9) at 111-180. The continuing growth of legal expenses
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Found. Research Reporter, Summer 1981, p. I, 7.
187 Smith, A Warmer of Dispution - Mediation and Conciliation: AM. J. Comp. L. 25 (1978).
Suppl. 205.
188 See also the discussion in Johnson, The Justice System of the Future - Four Scenarios foi the
Twenty-Firts Century, in: Access to Justice and the Welfare Stat8(supra, note 3) at 183.
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To begin, we should reemphasize that conciliation is a technique, not a
result. It is a process that connotes relatively open discussion, an expanded
focus on the full dimensions of the dispute, and an effort to find a resolution
that looks toward normal future relations; but the exact outcome of
conciliation depends on a large number of factors external to the immediate
dispute and a conciliator's idea of how to resolve it. Therefore a movement
toward conciliation need not suggest an abandonment of the rights
orientation that we pointed to in our characterizations of waves one and
two.
Conciliation can mean a retreat from promises that welfare state rights
or more generally, rights that purport to redistribute power -will be
enforced. It can mean a neglect for new laws and effort to persuade the weak
to compromise and to accept terms favorable to organizations with whom
they are likely to come into conflict. Conciliation may also or instead be
part of a large-scale effort to extend legal regulation into new georgraphic
and social areas, as the Chinese experiment illustrates. It may be an effort, in
particular, to extend the social control of the police and the criminal law
into areas - urban ones especially - where it is feared that there is
instability. And conciliation might also have the potential to promote
indigenous law and local control able to resist the spread of law and
regulation characteristic of the modern state.
There is a movement toward conciliatory forms of justice, but it can go
in several different directions and will not necessarily mean the same thing
in every country. As stated before, that depends on other social and political
factors, how other dispute processing institutions operate, and how the
particular conciliatory agencies are organized. We need to know what kinds
of disputes are processed, how the balance of power issue is addressed in
practice, and what the results are of conciliation. If, for example, work
safety is negotiated by agreement among labor unions, employers, and the
government and monitored by onions in such a way that few disputes over
make court, we should not exaggerate the social significance of a
dissatisfied worker's weaknesses in trying to make a particular claim. That
worker's lack of effective redress raises access-to-justice problems, but in the
example given the question of the general enforcement of a mandate for
better working conditions is simply not implicated.
A sustained political commitment, promoted by a powerful political
party or interest group, can do much to see that welfare state rights are of
more than symbolic value. The Swedish system's long commitment to the
welfare state illustrates well how the third wave can be channeled in the
interests of law enforcement of rights considered socially important. When
the best judges are small claims judges, for example, consumer-oriented law
has a better chance of being enforced by individuals. 189
The legal culture of United States is rather different from Sweden's, and
it often fools those who neglect its peculiar features. There is less of a
commitment to political programs, partly because of the remarkable
pluralism and corresponding absence of a strong party system. This means
18
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that there is also less of a commitment to follow through on legislation and
other legal reforms. The comment that the welfare state has "developed
step-by-step, reluctantly and involuntarily," ' 190 applies especially well to
the United States. The United States relies to a greater extent than other
countries on an array of private or at least largely independent institutions
like neighborhood and public interest law firms to enforce welfare state
rights. We have been reminded that some portion of the reform effort
represented by such institutions is "symbolic politics,"1 9' but then we must
also realize that the attack on such institutions may in part be symbolic as
well. There is an attack in the United States. It looks like the third wave may
be used as a substitute for the first two waves and the promises they
embodied. But symbolic politics can go both ways, and we cannot yet reach
clear .conclusions.
Moreover, before we conclude that the third wave of access to justice
necessarily means a retreat from the ideals of the welfare state, in the United
States or elsewhere, we should reflect on what has so far been the access
movement's legacy.
First, access to justice has irrevocably politicized issues about reform of
courts and court procedures. Max Weber observed some seventy years ago
that the system of civil procedure in England has promoted economic
growth by helping the interests of merchants and employers over those of
the poor and the working class,192 but most scholars then paid Ittle attention
so such issues. Now, however, the political connections between procedures
and substance are recognized to a much greater extent. Legal sociologists,
political scientists, and anthropologists, among others, are detailing the
role of procedures in the "transformation of disputes"' 9 3 and we are
learning precisely how and wheh laws and legal policies are enforced. It has
become impossible, therefore, to ignore the problem of enforcement when
new legislation is debated or enacted. The political focus is increasingly on
the machinery for enforcement as much as on the law's substantive
provisions, and that in turn leads to further important consequences. It has
become much more difficult to pretend that a particular law has solved a
problem just because the law is in the books.
The recognition of enforcement difficulties also helps to maintain a
certain momentum for reform, since a law's purported beneficiaries and
other reformers can rally around a demand for the benefits offerred by the
law. 194 They can assert a claim of rights based on what appears to be
accepted public policy, and policymakers can address their arguments for
better and more efficient enforcement mechanisms. Access-to-justice
190 Offe, Advanced Capitalism and the Welfare State: Politics and Society 2 (1972) 479, 485.
191 See notes 19-21 and acompanying text supra.
192 Max Weber on Law and Economy in Society, ed. by Rheinstein (1954) 353.

193 See. e.g., FelstinerlAbel/Sarat, The Emergence and Transformation of Disputes Naming,
Blaming, Claiming...: Law and Society Rev. 16 (1981) 631; Matherl Yngvesson, Languague,Audience,
and the Transformation of Disputes: Law and Society Rev. 16 (1981) 775. A model study of consumer
laws and lawyer is Macauley, Lawyers and Consumer Protection Laws: Law and Society Rev. 14 (1979)
115.
194 This phenomenon appears, for example, to have happened in Britain with respect to race

relations, where the procedures have been changed several times to enhance their effectiveness. See
Wilson, Alternative to Litigation: Recent British Experience, in: Les conciliateurs 67.
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concerns push toward the fulfillment of the promises embodied in
legislation. Similarly, the recent focus on access-to-justice issues makes a
decision to reduce enforcement a politically visible and therefore painful
one. The political consequences for the substantive law are now too well
known.
The second legacy of the access-to-j ustice movement builds on the-first.
The political consequences of inadequate enforcement are not only
increasingly recognized, but also there is a growing constituency insisting
that the structural and practical barriers to enforcement of laws on behalf of
the "have-nots" ought to be overcome. This constituency includes those
who, because of recent developments in standing and in the representation
of diffuse interests, already have been taking an active role in private law
enforcement. It is difficult at this point to take away that enforcement
power. Two examples from the United States illustrate the situation which
has emerged. First, despite the efforts of the Reagan administration,
federally-funded legal services for the poor have not yet been killed; at the
very least this program has held on much longer than other programs
targeted for elimination. Second, the American Bar Association has
apparently killed or at least weakened considerably the efforts that would
have deprived federal courts of jurisdiction to enforce certain politically
unpopular claims, such as claims for school desegregation.' The accessto-justice consitutuency, represented in part by the legal profession in such
organizations as the Association, has own made it politically very difficult
to strip away substantive rights by altering procedures.
A third legacy is probably a result of the first two. The concern with
access has no doubt enhanced the sense of crisis associated with welfare
states. The recent attention to enforcement has promoted reforms that have
enhanced the penetration of welfare state laws and regulations and has
given us an idea of what it might cost really to enforce all such laws. Costs
have gone up, often beyond what legislators might have predicted, and we
see what the true cost of an "effective" welfare state might be. Costs include
those imposed on business and government, the general cost of a
proliferation of bureaucracies, and of course those of excesive law,
legalization and litigation - not to mention the specter of too many
lawyers. The welfare state tendency toward countless new laws followed in
most countries by somewhat lax legal enforcement has been called into
question. Access-to-justice concerns have helped force us to ask questions
about priorities. We must ask which laws and policies are of great
importance, how much enforcement do we want, and at what cost. We must
consider, for example, when is it more useful to resolve a dispute than
enforce a legal policy, and when the mandates of the law should take
precedence.
The legacy, in conclusion, is one of a changed politico-legalclimate,
where procedure and substance are inextricably linked. That recognition of
this link might lead to cutbacks in laws, regulations, and bureaucracies
with a view toward a "reprivatized economy". The costs of enforcement
195 For the ABA position, see, e.g., Editorial Opinion and Comment - Backdoor Amendment: Am.
B. Ass. J. 67 (1981) 1082.
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may be considered too great to justify the substantive benefits that laws and
regulations have promised. Instead, or in addition, however, the political
result may be a decision on priorities, with legal machinery tailored to
assure that those priorities are respected and accomplished. Finally, there
might be efforts to move further toward the equality promoted by the
welfare state without relying so much on more and more law and more legal
or quasi-legal proceedings. The movement toward informalism can be
consistent with either of these possibilities. What is clear, however, is that
the courts and lawyers have now been swept into discussions of political
problems and their proposed solutions. Some individuals and groups may
prefer the policies and approaches of Reagan and some those of Mitterrand,
for example, but there is no doubt that legal policy will occupy more of this
political generation's time than it did for their predecessors. 196 And it
appears that legal policy, whatever the political aim, will include an
increasing effort to develop and use alternatives to the courts (or normal
court procedures) that rely on persuasion and conciliation rather than
simply on traditional "adversary" proceedings.

196 It is interesting that one of President Mitterand's first speeches after his election concerned his
proposed plans to "rapprochoer la justice du peuple francais." See Le'Monde, June 27, 1981, at 14.
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APPENDIX A
COUNCIL OF EUROPE
Recommendation No. R (81) 7
of the Committee of Ministers to Member Stte
on Measures Facilitating Access to Justice
(Adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 14 May 1981 at its 68th Session)
The Committee of Ministers, under the terms of Article 15.b of the Statute
of the Council of Europe.
Considering that the rights of access to justice and to a fair hearing as
guaranteed under Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights,
is an essential feature of any democratic society.
Considering that court procedure is often so complex, time-consuming
and costly that private individuals, especially those is an economically or
socially weak position, encounter serious difficulties in the exercise of their
rights in member states.
Bearing in mind that an effective system of legal aid and legal advice, as
provided for under Resolution (78)8 of the Commitee of Ministers, may
greatly conribute to the elimination of such obstacles;
Considering that it is nevertheless desirable also to take all necessary
measure in order to simplify the procedure in all appropriate cases with a
view to facilitating access to justice of the individual whilst ensuring at the
same time that justice is done;
Considering that, with a view to facilitating access to justice, it is
desirable to simplify documents used in such procedures.
Recommends the governments of member states to take or reinforce, as
the case may be, all measures which they consider necessary with a view to the
progressive implementation of the principles set out in the appendix to this
recommendation.
Appendix to Recommendation No. R(81.)7
Principles
Member states should take all necessary steps to inform the public on the
means open to an individual to assert his rights before courts and to make
judicial proceedings, relating to civil, commercial, administrative, social or
fiscal matters simple, speedy and inexpensive. To this end member states
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should have particular regard to the matters enumerated in the following
principles.
A. Information to the public
1. Appropriate measures should be taken to informa the public of the
location and competence of the courts and the way in which proceedings are
commenced or defended before those courts.
2. General information should be available from the court or a
competent body or service on the following items:
procedural requirements provided that this information does not
involve giving legal adivce concerning the substance of the case;
- the way in which, and the time within which, a decision can be
challenged, the rules of procedure and any required documents to this effect;
methods by which a decision might be enforced, and it possible, the
costs involved.
B. Simplification
3. Measures should be taken to facilitate or encourage, whereappropriate
the conciliation of the parties and the amicable settlerment of disputes before
any court proceedings have been instituted or in the course of proceedings.
4. No litigant should be prevented from being assisted by a lawyer. The
compulsory recourse of a party to the services of an unnecesary plurality of
lawyers for need of a particular case is to be avoided. Where, having regard to
the nature of the matter involved, it would be desirable, in order to facilitate
access to justice, for an individual to put his own case before the courts, then
representation by a lawyer should not be compulsory.
5. States should take measures to ensure that all procedural documents
are in a simply form and that the language used is comprehensible to the
public and any judicial decision is comprehensible to the parties.
6. Where one of the parties to the proceedings does not have sufficient
knowledge of the language of the court, states should pay particular
attention to the problems of interpretation and translation and ensure that
persons in an economically weak position are not disavantaged in relation to
access to be court or in the course of any proceedings by their inability to
speak or understand the language of the court.
7. Measures should be taken in order that the number of experts
appointed by the court for the same proceedings either on its initiative or at
the request of the parties should be as limited as possible.
C. Accelaration
8. All measures should be taken to minimise the time to reach a
determination of the issues. To this end steps should be taken to eliminate
archaic procedures which until no useful purpose, to ensure that the coursts
are adequately staffed and they operate efficiently, and to adopt procedures
which will enable the court to follow the action from an early stage.
9. Provisions should be made for undisputed or established liquidated
claims to ensure that in these matters a final decision is obtained quickly
without unnecessary formality, appearances before the court or cost.
10. So that right of appeal should not be exercised improperly or in order
to delay proceedings, particular attention should be given to the possibility
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of provisional execution of court decisions which might lead to an appeal
and to the rate of interest on the judgment sum pending execution.
D. Cost of Justice
11. No sum of money should be required of a party on behalf of the state
as a condition of commencing proceedings which would be unreasonable
having regard to the matters in issue.
12. In so far as the court fees constitute a manifest impediment to justice
thd be, if possible, reduced or abolished. The system of court fees should be
examined in view of its simplification.
13. Particular attention should be given to the question of lawyers' and
experts' fees in so far as they constitute an obstacle to access tojustice. Some
form of control of the amount of these fees should be ensured.
14. Except in special circumstances a winning party should in
principle obtain from the losing party recovery of his costs including
lawyers' fees, reasonably incurred in the proceedings.
E. Special procedures
15. Where there is a dispute about a small amount of money or money's
worth, a procedure should be provided that enables the parties to put their
case before the court without incurring expense that is out of proportion to
the amount at issue. To this end consideration could be given to the
provision of simple forms, the avoidances of unnecesary hearings and the
limitation of the right of appeal.
16. States should ensure that the procedures concerning family law are
simple, speedy, inexpensive and respect the personal nature of the matters
in issue. These matters should, as far as possible, be dealt with in private.

